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COULD OFFICIAL CLIMATE DENIAL REVIVE
THE COMMON LAW AS A REGULATORY
BACKSTOP?
MARK P. NEVITT & ROBERT V. PERCIVAL
ABSTRACT
The Trump Administration is rapidly turning the clock back on climate
policy and environmental regulation. Despite overwhelming, peerreviewed scientific evidence, administration officials eager to promote
greater use of fossil fuels are disregarding climate science. This Article
argues that this massive and historic deregulation may spawn yet another
wave of legal innovation as litigants, including states and their political
subdivisions, return to the common law to protect the health of the planet.
Prior to the emergence of the major federal environmental laws in the
1970s, the common law of nuisance gave rise to the earliest environmental
decisions in U.S. history. In some of these cases, the Supreme Court issued
injunctions to control significant sources of air and water pollution, but
the Court later held that the Clean Water Act and Clean Air Act displaced
the federal common law of nuisance.
This Article argues that official climate denial may yet revive the
common law as a regulatory backstop. If the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency reverses its earlier endangerment finding for
greenhouse gas emissions, the Clean Air Act may no longer displace the
federal common law of nuisance. While expert administrative agencies
normally are more competent than the judiciary in fashioning regulatory
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policy, agencies that deny climate science should expect to face judicial
intervention. As described in this Article, such action is consistent with the
historic role the judiciary has played when other branches of government
failed to prevent significant environmental harm.
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“Global warming may be a ‘crisis,’ even ‘the most pressing
environmental problem of our time.’ Indeed, it may ultimately affect
nearly everyone on the planet in some potentially adverse way, and it may
be that governments have done too little to address it. It is not a problem,
however, that has escaped the attention of policymakers in the Executive
and Legislative Branches of our Government, who continue to consider
regulatory, legislative, and treaty-based means of addressing global
climate change.”
— Chief Justice John Roberts, dissenting in Massachusetts v.
EPA (2007)1
“The concept of global warming was created by and for the Chinese in
order to make U.S. manufacturing non-competitive.”
— Donald J. Trump, Nov. 6, 20122
INTRODUCTION
Prior to the advent of comprehensive regulatory programs to protect the
environment, the common law served as the primary vehicle for redressing
environmental harm. More than a century ago, states used the common
law of interstate nuisance to seek redress for the most serious
transboundary pollution problems.3 Exercising its original jurisdiction over
disputes between states, the U.S. Supreme Court issued injunctions

1.
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 535 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citation
omitted).
2.
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Nov. 6, 2012, 11:15 AM),
https://twitter. com/realdonaldtrump/status/265895292191248385?lang=en [http://perma.cc/XN5STLQ6].
3.
Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496
(1906).
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limiting smelter emissions4 and requiring cities to build sewage treatment
plants5 and garbage incinerators.6
Today the common law has been eclipsed by the enactment of federal
legislation requiring agencies to regulate sources of pollution. These
statutes have been interpreted broadly to give agencies great power to
respond to emerging problems. For example, in Massachusetts v. EPA the
U.S. Supreme Court held that the Clean Air Act (CAA) gives the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) the authority to regulate
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions if they “endanger public health or
welfare”7 by contributing to global warming and climate change.8 The
Court rejected not only the claim that EPA lacked such authority, but also
the agency’s other rationales for refusing to take action.9 Following the
ruling, EPA had to decide “whether sufficient information exist[ed] to
make an endangerment finding.”10 It made the endangerment finding two
years later.11
In a series of cases beginning in the 1970s, the Court has held that the
comprehensive regulatory programs erected by the Clean Water Act
(CWA) and the CAA displace federal common law nuisance claims.12
When states sought to use public nuisance law to address the threats posed
by climate change, industry groups urged the Court to bar such actions on
constitutional grounds.13 Instead, in June 2011 the Court held in American
Electric Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut (AEP) that the CAA displaced
federal common law nuisance claims in the context of regulating GHG
emissions. At the time of the ruling, the Obama Administration EPA was
moving aggressively to regulate GHG emissions. But, writing for a
unanimous Court, Justice Ginsburg warned that a decision by the EPA not

4.
Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 237 U.S. 474 (1915).
5.
Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367 (1929).
6.
New Jersey v. New York City, 290 U.S. 237 (1933).
7.
42 U.S.C. § 7521(3)(D) (2012).
8.
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 533 (2007).
9.
Id. at 528–34.
10.
Id. at 534.
11.
Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section
202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,495 (Dec. 15, 2009).
12.
Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011) (holding that the CAA displaced
the federal common law of interstate nuisance for regulating GHG emissions); City of Milwaukee v.
Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (holding that the CWA displaced the federal common law
of interstate nuisance). But the Court also made clear that federal environmental laws do not
necessarily preempt state common law nuisance claims. Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481
(1987) (holding that state law is not preempted as long as the law of the source state is applied). In
American Electric Power Co., the Court expressly reserved the question whether the CAA preempted
state common law nuisance claims. 564 U.S. at 429.
13.
See infra Part I.B.
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to regulate greenhouse gas emissions would invite litigation and would be
subject to judicial review.14
With the election of President Trump, federal environmental policy has
sharply shifted. The President has announced his intent to withdraw the
U.S. from the Paris Agreement that every other country in the world has
accepted as a global response to climate change.15 EPA is moving
aggressively to repeal the Obama Administration’s Clean Power Plan,16
roll back Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards, and
attempt to preempt state programs to reduce GHG emissions.17 Many
Trump supporters want EPA to reverse its finding that GHG emissions
endanger public health and welfare by contributing to climate change.18
If the Trump EPA reverses the 2009 endangerment finding, this would
foreclose the EPA’s ability to use the CAA to regulate GHG emissions.
This Article considers whether such an action unwittingly could revive the
federal common law of nuisance as a regulatory backstop. While the
Supreme Court ruled in AEP that the CAA displaces any federal common
law right to seek abatement of carbon-dioxide emissions from fossil fuelfired power plants, this was predicated on EPA actually making a reasoned
and informed judgment of GHG emission dangers—not jettisoning agency
expertise in favor of politics.19 This litigation, particularly if brought by
14.
AEP, 564 U.S. at 426–27 (“EPA’s judgment, we hasten to add, would not escape judicial
review. . . . If the plaintiffs in this case are dissatisfied with the outcome of EPA’s forthcoming
rulemaking, their recourse under federal law is to seek [judicial] review, and, ultimately, to petition for
certiorari in this Court.”).
15.
Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord (June 1, 2017), https://www.
whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-trump-paris-climate-accord/
[https://perma.cc /J4D7-7V2G].
16.
See Eric Lipton, President’s Rush to Deregulate Meets an Obstacle: The Courts, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 7, 2017 at A1. Administrator Pruitt moved swiftly to roll back Obama-era Clean Power
Plan rules. See, e.g., Brady Dennis & Juliet Eilperin, EPA Chief Scott Pruitt Tells Coal Miners He Will
Repeal Power Plant Rule Tuesday: ‘The War Against Coal is Over,’ WASH. POST (Oct. 9, 2017),
https://www. washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2017/10/09/pruitt-tells-coal-minershe-will-repeal-power-plan-rule-tuesday-the-war-on-coal-isover/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.b0739170e67f [https://p erma.cc/MJ86-65KL]. His successor has
continued to do so. See infra note 17.
17.
On August 21, 2018, EPA Acting Administrator Andrew Wheeler proposed the
“Affordable Clean Energy Rule” that seeks to replace the Clean Power Plan. 83 Fed. Reg. 44,746
(Aug. 31, 2018); Press Release, EPA, EPA Proposes Affordable Clean Energy (ACE) Rule (Aug. 21,
2018),
https://www.
epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-proposes-affordable-clean-energy-ace-rule
[https://perma.cc/AKD4-F5DT]. Mark Hand, Widespread Disapproval Greets Trump’s Rollback of
Auto Emissions and Fuel Efficiency Standards, THINK PROGRESS (Aug. 2, 2018, 10:28 AM),
https://thinkprogress.org/widespread-disappro val-greets-trumps-rollback-of-auto-emissions-and-fuelefficiency-standards-e5e65a8a4607/ [https://per ma.cc/KT56-ARR5].
18.
Tom DiChristopher, EPA Chief Scott Pruitt Won’t Rule out Repealing the Foundation of
Obama-Era Climate Change Rules, CNBC (Jan. 30, 2018, 7:43 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/
30/epa-chief-scott-pruitt-wont-rule-out-repealing-endangerment-finding.html [https://perma.cc/4LMCM4TT].
19.
See Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. 304, 324 (1981) (“The question [for purposes of displacement]
is whether the field has been occupied, not whether it has been occupied in a particular manner.”). But
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states as quasi-sovereigns against EPA, could serve as a powerful prod to
force federal action on climate change. After all, states have the “last word
as to whether [their] mountains shall be stripped of their forests and [their]
inhabitants shall breathe pure air.”20
In light of the Trump EPA’s current stance on environmental
regulations, the Court’s decision in AEP, and other nuisance cases decided
by federal appellate courts,21 this is a propitious time to reconsider the use
of public nuisance law to redress environmental problems. This Article
focuses on what we call “the common law of interstate nuisance”—a body
of law developed when states, acting in a parens patriae capacity, sought
to protect their citizens from environmental harm originating in other
states through public nuisance actions under either federal or state
common law.22
This Article makes two core arguments. First, it maintains that the
common law of nuisance remains an essential backstop when existing
regulatory authorities fail to address significant environmental problems.
Second, reconnecting nuisance law to its historical roots, the Article
maintains that common law litigation has served as an effective prod to
help spur the development and implementation of new pollution control
technology and to stimulate regulatory action to require its use, rather than
serving as a vehicle for the judiciary to impose its own solutions for
environmental problems.23

this is predicated on some form of occupation; a refusal to occupy the field is an abdication of
responsibility. See AEP, 564 U.S. at 424 (reviewing the provisions of the CAA that require EPA to
regulate emissions once a pollutant has been found to endanger public health or welfare).
20.
Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907).
21.
Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, 734 F.3d 188 (3d Cir. 2013); North Carolina ex rel.
Cooper v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 615 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2010); Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs,
667 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2011).
22.
See Sara Zdeb, Note, From Georgia v. Tennessee Copper to Massachusetts v. EPA: Parens
Patriae Standing for State Global-Warming Plaintiffs, 96 GEO. L.J. 1059 (2008). State attorneys
general also have sought to use public nuisance actions to recover damages from the manufacturers of
tobacco products, firearms, and lead-based paint, see, e.g., NAT’L ASS’N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., Master
Settlement
Agreement,
http://www.naag.org/assets/redesign/files/msa-tobacco/MSA.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RF79-8 8ZJ] (settlement of tobacco litigation); District of Columbia v. Beretta,
U.S.A., Corp., 872 A.2d 633 (D.C. 2005) (firearms); City of Philadelphia v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 994
F.2d 112 (3d Cir. 1993) (lead-based paint), but these mass products liability cases are not addressed in
this Article. The Article also does not consider private nuisance litigation, including cases brought by
private parties to redress harm allegedly caused by climate change. See, e.g., Comer v. Murphy Oil
USA, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009) (rejecting political question and lack of standing as grounds for
dismissing lawsuit against oil companies for their contribution to climate change by victims of
Hurricane Katrina who allege that climate change made the hurricane more severe), reh’g granted en
banc, 598 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 2010), reh’g dismissed en banc, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010)
(dismissing appeal for lack of quorum to transact judicial business due to disqualification of eight
judges), mandamus denied, 562 U.S. 1133 (2011).
23.
Cf. Benjamin Ewing & Douglas A. Kysar, Prods and Pleas: Limited Government in an Era
of Unlimited Harm, 121 YALE L.J. 350 (2011).
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This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I reviews the history of the
common law of interstate nuisance from the early twentieth century
through the rise of the modern regulatory state.24 Part II focuses on efforts
to use this doctrine to control GHG emissions causing climate change,
focusing on state efforts to require utilities operating coal-fired power
plants to reduce their emissions. These efforts culminated in the Supreme
Court’s decision in AEP v. Connecticut holding that the CAA displaces
federal common law. Part III then considers why AEP does not eliminate
common law as a regulatory backstop, as illustrated by the Seventh
Circuit’s decision that it could be used to address problems not covered by
existing regulatory statutes.25 Part IV then considers how official climate
denial could revitalize the common law and return the judiciary to its
historic role of responding when the other branches fail to address
significant environmental harm.
I. A HISTORY OF INTERSTATE NUISANCE LAW
Although Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins held that there “is no federal
general common law,”26 the Supreme Court has continually recognized
that when dealing “with air and water in their ambient or interstate aspects,
there is a federal common law . . . .”27 Beginning in 1901 and over a halfcentury period prior to the modern environmental law movement that
ushered in the modern federal environmental regulatory state, the Court
recognized the right of states to bring common law nuisance actions to
redress interstate pollution.28 These cases were brought directly to the U.S.
Supreme Court under its original jurisdiction conferred by Article III,
Section 2 of the Constitution governing disputes between states.29
As noted above, the Court umpired interstate pollution disputes and
issued injunctions limiting air and water pollution.30 In other cases the
24.
One of the authors previously has reviewed in detail the history of the federal common law
of nuisance for interstate water pollution disputes. See Robert V. Percival, The Clean Water Act and
the Demise of the Federal Common Law of Interstate Nuisance, 55 ALA. L. REV. 717 (2004).
25.
Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 667 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2011).
26.
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
27.
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee I), 406 U.S. 91, 103 (1972) (emphasis added).
28.
Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241–43 (1901).
29.
“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution [and] the Laws of the United States . . . to Controversies between two or more States . . .
.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. The framers of the Constitution clearly contemplated that the Court would
play an important role in resolving more than just boundary disputes between states. As Alexander
Hamilton explained: “[T]here are many other sources, beside interfering claims of boundary, from
which bickerings and animosities may spring up among the members of the Union. . . . Whatever
practices may have a tendency to disturb the harmony between the States, are proper objects of federal
superintendence and control.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 440 (Alexander Hamilton) (Colonial Press
1901).
30.
See supra notes 4–6.
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Court denied relief because it found that plaintiff states had failed to prove
sufficient causal injury and/or were themselves engaged in similar
polluting activities.31 At times the Court expressed discomfort umpiring
interstate pollution disputes,32 but it acknowledged its unique authority to
vindicate the interests of states in protecting their citizens from
transboundary pollution.33
Concerned about the fact-intensive and technical nature of such
litigation, the Supreme Court eventually relegated interstate nuisance
actions to the federal district courts.34 After efforts to persuade states to
adopt effective regulatory programs failed, in the early 1970s Congress
adopted comprehensive national regulatory legislation to protect air and
water quality. These laws included the CWA and CAA. Following these
major legislative achievements, the Supreme Court pulled back even
further, ruling that both the CWA35 and CAA36 displace the federal
common law of interstate nuisance. But state common law nuisance
actions using the law of the source state remain viable as both a litigation
tool and prod for action.37
A. The Initial Public Nuisance Cases
1. Missouri v. Illinois (1906): The First Interstate Nuisance Case
Decided by the Supreme Court
In the late nineteenth century and well before the passage of the CWA,
most cities disposed of their sewage simply by dumping it untreated into
nearby lakes or streams.38 Not surprisingly, this caused massive public
health issues. At the turn of the twentieth century, Chicago’s widespread
use of this practice spawned the first major interstate pollution dispute to
reach the U.S. Supreme Court.39 Chicago disposed of its raw sewage by
dumping it directly into the Chicago River, which flowed into Lake
Michigan, the source of the city’s drinking water. Not surprisingly, the
city suffered numerous health problems linked to contaminated drinking
water including cholera epidemics and high death rates from typhoid

31.
New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906).
32.
New York, 256 U.S. at 313.
33.
Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901).
34.
Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
35.
Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
36.
AEP, 564 U.S. 410 (2011).
37.
Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
38.
See Mayor of Newark v. Sayre, 45 A. 985, 988 (N.J. 1900) (“[F]rom time immemorial the
right to connect [sewers] with navigable streams has been regarded as part of the jus publicum.”).
39.
Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906).
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fever.40 To resolve the city’s sewage disposal problem, the state of Illinois
approved construction of a canal to reverse the flow of the Chicago River
to take the sewage away from Lake Michigan.41 By 1900 Chicago’s
sewage was flowing down the Chicago River to the Des Plaines River,
which drained into the Mississippi River.42 Because Missouri cities used
the Mississippi as their source of drinking water, Missouri residents were
alarmed.43
The Supreme Court allowed Missouri’s attorney general to file a
common law nuisance action against Illinois to enjoin Illinois and the
Sanitary District of Chicago from discharging sewage through the canal.44
In an initial ruling, Justice Shiras emphasized that “if the health and
comfort of the inhabitants of a State are threatened, the State is the proper
party to represent and defend them,”45 and “that an adequate remedy can
only be found in this court at the suit of the State of Missouri.” 46 In doing
so, Justice Shiras dismissed Illinois’s claim that individual private
nuisance actions could be an adequate remedy for the harm Missouri
alleged.47
After five years of intensive fact gathering before a special
commissioner, a unanimous Court ultimately denied the relief sought by
Missouri in February 1906.48 Writing for the Court, Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes stated, “Before this court ought to intervene the case should be of
serious magnitude, clearly and fully proved, and the principle to be applied
should be one which the court is prepared deliberately to maintain against
all considerations on the other side.”49 Holmes recognized that advances in
scientific knowledge, such as acceptance of the germ theory of diseases,
meant that nuisances could include even things that cannot “be detected by
the unassisted senses.”50 But the Court ultimately held that Missouri had
failed to prove sufficient causal injury: the experts for both sides were
sharply split on whether Chicago sewage was capable of causing typhoid
fever in St. Louis.51 Further undermining Missouri’s causal argument,
there had not been an increase in typhoid cases in cities between St. Louis

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 498; see also Chicago’s Quest for Pure Water, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 2, 1900, at 9.
Chicago’s Quest for Pure Water, supra note 40.
Id.; Turn the River into Big Canal, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 3, 1900, at 9.
St. Louis Has Two Rebuffs, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 4, 1900, at 5.
Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901).
Id. at 241.
Id.
Id.
Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906).
Id. at 521 (emphasis added).
Id. at 522.
Id. at 523.

449

450

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 96:441

and Chicago despite other cities disposing their raw sewage in the same
river.52
2. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper (1907): The Court Acknowledges
States’ Special Status as Quasi-Sovereigns
Just one year after it decided Missouri v. Illinois, the Supreme Court in
1907 decided another prominent interstate public nuisance pollution
dispute. This time the controversy involved Georgia’s claim that sulfur
dioxide emissions from two copper smelters located just across the border
in Tennessee had destroyed crops and other vegetation in northern
Georgia.53 In October 1905 Georgia filed suit against the smelters in the
U.S. Supreme Court.54 The smelter owners successfully convinced the
Court not to grant preliminary relief to the state of Georgia.55 But the
Court ordered that the case be tried on an expedited basis. After hearing
two days of oral argument in February 1907, the Supreme Court released
its decision on May 13, 1907.56
In an opinion by Justice Holmes the Court declared that Georgia had
established its right to obtain an injunction requiring abatement of
emissions from the smelters.57 Holmes emphasized that this was not a
lawsuit “between two private parties,” but instead “a suit by a State for an
injury to it in its capacity of quasi-sovereign.”58 Thus, he found it
unnecessary for Georgia to establish that state-owned property had
suffered significant harm because “the State has an interest independent of
and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its
domain. It has the last word as to whether its mountains shall be stripped
of their forests and its inhabitants shall breathe pure air.”59
Damages were not adequate to compensate Georgia, Holmes declared,
because a state’s quasi-sovereign rights cannot be bought.60 Because a
state’s sovereign right to protect its citizens against transboundary
52.
Id. at 523–26.
53.
Three years before, in 1904, the Tennessee Supreme Court had heard a private nuisance
action brought against the same smelters by nearby landowners. It had awarded modest damages to the
plaintiffs, but it emphatically rejected the plaintiffs’ demands to require the smelters to abate their
emissions in light of the great economic value of the enterprises. Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur,
Copper & Iron Co., 83 S.W. 658 (Tenn. 1904).
54.
On Oct. 4, 1905, Georgia filed its motion for approval to file a bill of complaint, which was
approved by the Supreme Court on October 23, 1905. Case files of Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.,
Orig. No. 5, U.S. National Archives, Record Group 267.3.3.
55.
Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 236 (1907).
56.
Id. at 230.
57.
Id. at 239.
58.
Id. at 237.
59.
Id. at 237.
60.
Id. at 237–38.
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pollution was at stake, Holmes declared that the Court should be less
inclined to give weight to the traditional factors relevant to the exercise of
equitable discretion.61 Holmes declared:
It is a fair and reasonable demand on the part of a sovereign that the
air over its territory should not be polluted on a great scale by
sulphurous acid gas, that the forests on its mountains, be they better
or worse, and whatever domestic destruction they have suffered,
should not be further destroyed or threatened by the act of persons
beyond its control, that the crops and orchards on its hills should not
be endangered from the same source.62
Reviewing the evidence, Holmes found it clear that the vast quantities
of pollution from the smelters “cause and threaten damage on so
considerable a scale to the forests and vegetable life, if not to health,
within the plaintiff State as to make out a case within the requirements of
Missouri v. Illinois . . . .”63 Having upheld Georgia’s right to an injunction,
Justice Holmes left it up to the state to decide if that was truly its preferred
remedy.64 He concluded his opinion by stating: “If the State of Georgia
adheres to its determination, there is no alternative to issuing an injunction
. . . .”65 Rather than immediately issuing an injunction, the Court decided
to allow “a reasonable time to the defendants to complete the structures
that they now are building, and the efforts that they are making, to stop the
fumes.”66
While more than a “reasonable time” passed, a settlement was finally
reached in February 1911 between the Tennessee Copper Company and
the state of Georgia.67 However, the operator of the second smelter, the
Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Company, refused to settle. After even
more hearings in the Supreme Court, the Court held in May 1915 that the
Ducktown Company had not met its burden of proving that its emissions
61.
Balancing of the traditional factors to be considered before granting equitable relief had
been a focal point of the parties’ oral arguments. These factors included
a comparison between the damage threatened to the plaintiff and the calamity of a possible
stop to the defendants’ business, the question of health, the character of the forests as a first or
second growth, the commercial possibility or impossibility of reducing the fumes to sulphuric
acid, the special adaptation of the business to the place.
Id. at 238.
62.
Id.
63.
Id. at 238–39.
64.
Id. at 239.
65.
Id.
66.
Id. at 239.
67.
The company agreed to cut back on sulphur emissions from the smelter during the growing
season from May 20 to September 1. Additionally, two years later a compensation fund was created
for victims in Northern Georgia. Case files of Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., Orig. No. 5, U.S.
National Archives, Record Group 267.3.3.
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no longer were causing harm in Georgia.68 On June 1, 1915, the Court
issued a decree directing the Ducktown Company to limit sulfur emissions
to twenty tons per day from April 10 to October 1 and forty tons per day
during the rest of year.69

3. Sewage, Garbage & Water Diversion Conflicts Decided by the
Court
Sewage disposal problems precipitated another interstate nuisance
dispute filed in the U.S. Supreme Court in 1908. The state of New York
sued New Jersey in an effort to block construction of a tunnel that would
channel New Jersey sewage discharges away from the heavily polluted
Passaic River into Upper New York Bay.70 Justice John H. Clarke
authored a unanimous decision holding that New York had not presented
sufficient evidence to warrant issuance of an injunction.71 The Court
acknowledged New York’s right to sue New Jersey, but it held that New
York had not satisfied its burden of establishing a serious invasion of its
rights “by clear and convincing evidence.”72 The Court also noted that the
federal government had the right to stop New Jersey’s sewage discharges
if they subsequently caused harm as a result of the settlement agreement,
which Charles Evan Hughes (lawyer for New York) described as the
reason for his defeat.73 In an unusual aside, Justice Clarke opined that such
settlements were likely to effect better solutions to such disputes than any
lawsuits.74
In 1929 New Jersey turned the tables on New York by suing New York
City for dumping its garbage in the ocean where it eventually would wash
up on New Jersey beaches.75 This time the Court appointed a special
master to hear testimony in the case.76 The special master found that New
68.
Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 237 U.S. 474, 476–77 (1915).
69.
Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 237 U.S. 678, 680 (1915).
70.
New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 300 (1921).
71.
Id. at 309–10, 312–13.
72.
Id. at 309 (citing Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906)). The Court emphasized that
New York had failed to prove that there were visible suspended particles, odors, or a reduction in the
dissolved oxygen content of the Bay sufficient to interfere with aquatic life. Id. at 310–11.
73.
THE AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES OF CHARLES EVAN HUGHES 194–95 (David J. Danelski &
Joseph S. Tulchin eds., 1973).
74.
“We cannot withhold the suggestion,” that problems like the present case are “more likely
to be wisely solved by co-operative study and by conference and mutual concession on the part of . . .
the States so vitally interested in it than by proceedings in any court . . . .” 256 U.S. at 313.
75.
New Jersey v. City of New York, 283 U.S. 473 (1931).
76.
Id. at 477.
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York City had caused enough garbage to wash upon New Jersey shores to
fill fifty trucks, damaging fishnets and making swimming impracticable.77
The Court noted that “[t]he situs of the acts creating the nuisance, whether
within or without the United States, is of no importance” because the harm
occurred in the United States and the defendant was properly before the
Court and subject to its jurisdiction.78
In December 1931 the Court issued an injunction barring New York
City from dumping garbage into the ocean effective June 1, 1933, the date
recommended by the special master in order to enable the city to build
new incinerators.79 The Court also ordered the city to use its existing
incinerators at full capacity to reduce the amount of garbage dumped into
the ocean and to report to the Court every six months concerning its
progress in building new incinerators.80 After it became clear that New
York City would not meet the deadline for ending ocean dumping,
contempt proceedings were held.81 In December 1933 the Court extended
the deadline to July 1, 1934, while imposing a $5,000 per day fine on the
City if it missed this new deadline.82
Meanwhile, Illinois and the Sanitary District were also facing lawsuits
filed by the upper Great Lakes states in the U.S. Supreme Court in the
1920’s. Wisconsin, Michigan, and New York had sued Illinois and the
Sanitary District for allegedly diverting so much water from Lake
Michigan that it had reduced the level of the Great Lakes by five to six
inches, causing serious injury to people and property.83 Missouri and five
other downstream states intervened to join Illinois as defendants because
of their interest in keeping as much water as possible flowing through the
drainage canal to the Mississippi River.84
The Court accepted jurisdiction and appointed former Justice Charles
Evans Hughes to serve as a special master.85 After taking extensive
testimony, Hughes reported in November 1927 that the allegations by the
upper Great Lakes states were correct.86 In January 1929 the Court
accepted Hughes’s recommendations and ruled in favor of the upstream
states. In an opinion by Chief Justice William Howard Taft, the Court
rejected the notion that the Illinois and the Sanitary District were relieved
77.
Id. at 478.
78.
Id. at 482.
79.
New Jersey v. City of New York, 284 U.S. 585, 585–86 (1931) (per curiam).
80.
Id. at 586.
81.
New Jersey v. New York City, 290 U.S. 237, 238 (1933).
82.
Id. at 240.
83.
Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367, 407–09 (1929).
84.
Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Arkansas participated in the
case as intervening defendants. Id. at 370.
85.
Id.
86.
Id. at 407–09.
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from liability for harm caused to upstream states.87 The Court concluded
that the upstream states were entitled to equitable relief,88 and it ultimately
issued an injunction requiring Chicago to build sewage treatment plants to
reduce its need to divert water from Lake Michigan.89

B. The Court Sours on Hearing Interstate Nuisance Cases Following the
Enactment of Federal Regulatory Statutes
The U.S. Supreme Court’s long-time frustration with using its original
jurisdiction to hear fact-intensive interstate nuisance suits and its difficulty
in fashioning effective remedies ultimately led it to relegate such cases to
the lower federal courts. On three occasions in 1971 and 1972, the Court
declined requests to hear interstate nuisance cases in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction.90
In 1970, prior to the passage of the CWA, the state of Ohio sought to
bring an original action in the Court against the Wyandotte Chemical
Corporation and Dow Chemical of Canada to stop and remediate mercury
pollution in Lake Erie.91 After scheduling an unusual oral argument on the
question of whether to accept jurisdiction, the Court declined to hear the
case.92 In an opinion by Justice Harlan the Court explained that even
though it could exercise its original jurisdiction to hear the case, “no
necessity impels” the Court to be the “principal forum for settling such
controversies.”93 Harlan lamented the Court’s difficulty in resolving
disputes of interstate air and water pollution.94 Noting the decisions in
Missouri v. Illinois and New York v. New Jersey, Harlan felt the Court’s
attempts to resolve the conflicts were futile because of the complex
technical and political matters inherent in these cases.95 This was
exacerbated by the novel scientific questions that have no clear answer.96
87.
Id. at 417–19.
88.
Id. at 418–21.
89.
Wisconsin v. Illinois, 281 U.S. 179, 201 (1930); Wisconsin v. Illinois, 281 U.S. 696, 697
(1930) (per curiam).
90.
Ohio v. Wyandotte Chems. Corp. 401 U.S. 493 (1971); Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. 91 (1972);
Washington v. Gen. Motors Corp., 406 U.S. 109 (1972).
91.
Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. at 493.
92.
Id. at 494.
93.
Id. at 497.
94.
Id. at 505.
95.
Id. at 501–02.
96.
Id. at 501–03, 504–05. The papers of the late Justice Thurgood Marshall reveal that on the
morning of oral argument, Chief Justice Burger distributed an unusual memo strongly cautioning his
colleagues about the implications of a decision to hear the case. The Chief Justice cited the vast range
of pollution problems facing the fifty states and the complexity of the issues. “If we do grant leave to
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Acknowledging the intense public concern for the environment that then
prevailed, Justice Harlan conceded that stopping pollution “is manifestly a
matter of fundamental import and utmost urgency.”97 But he described the
Court’s refusal to hear the case as reflecting “that our competence is
necessarily limited, not that our concern should be kept within narrow
bounds.”98
Only Justice William O. Douglas dissented. He, too, acknowledged the
complexity of the issues presented by the case, but he argued that they
were no more difficult than the complex issues that arise in water rights
disputes between states that the Court routinely hears.99 Douglas cited the
long-running dispute between Wisconsin and Illinois over the diversion of
waters from Lake Michigan as well as disputes between Arizona and
California over the Colorado River and disputes between Colorado,
Wyoming and Nebraska over the waters of the North Platte River.100
1. Milwaukee I (1972): The Court Keeps Federal Common Law
Nuisance Claims Alive, but Relegates Them to Lower Federal
Courts
In Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee I), Illinois sought
permission from the Supreme Court to bring an original action against four
Wisconsin cities for polluting Lake Michigan through the discharge of 200
million gallons of raw or poorly treated sewage each day.101 The case was
decided six months before Congress enacted, over President Nixon’s veto,
comprehensive new federal legislation, popularly known as the Clean
Water Act (CWA), which required a permit for all point source discharges
of pollutants.102 The Court noted that “Congress has enacted numerous
laws touching interstate waters,” including the 1899 Rivers and Harbors
Act that banned unpermitted discharges of refuse to navigable waters.103
Federal law also authorized a cumbersome, and ultimately futile, interstate
conference procedure as a vehicle for settling interstate water pollution

file, I believe we should consider appointing not one but three Special Masters, at least one of whom
should be a scientist with background in the subject matter and without conflicting attachments or
published positions on the subject matter.” Memorandum from Chief Justice Warren E. Burger to the
Conference (Jan. 18, 1971) (on file with the Library of Congress).
97.
Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. at 505.
98.
Id.
99.
Id. at 511 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
100. Id.
101. Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. 91, 93 (1972).
102. The official name of the CWA is the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §
1251–1387 (2012).
103. Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 101.
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disputes.104 In Milwaukee I, the Court rejected arguments that these laws
displaced Illinois’s action.105
In Milwaukee I, the Court held that states could bring federal common
law nuisance actions in the district courts because they arise under federal
law within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331.106 The Court cited with
approval the Tenth Circuit’s holding in Texas v. Pankey107 as proof that
federal district courts could hear interstate nuisance actions.108 Quoting
from Pankey in a footnote, the Court stated that “[u]ntil the field has been
made the subject of comprehensive legislation or authorized
administrative standards, only a federal common law basis can provide an
adequate means for dealing with such claims as alleged federal rights.”109
But it also explained that “consideration of state standards may be
relevant” because “a State with high water-quality standards may well ask
that its strict standards be honored and that it not be compelled to lower
itself to the more degrading standards of a neighbor.”110 The Court
explained that when lower federal courts hear interstate nuisance actions
“[t]here are no fixed rules that govern; these will be equity suits in which
the informed judgment of the chancellor will largely govern.”111
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice William O. Douglas noted:
It may happen that new federal laws and new federal regulations
may in time pre-empt the field of federal common law of nuisance.
But until that comes to pass, federal courts will be empowered to
appraise the equities of the suits alleging creation of a public
nuisance by water pollution.112
The Court recognized that “this original suit normally might be the
appropriate vehicle for resolving this controversy,” but it chose instead to
exercise its “discretion to remit the parties to an appropriate district court
whose powers are adequate to resolve the issues.”113
In a lawsuit between two states—Vermont and New York—the Court
agreed to hear an interstate pollution dispute in exercise of its original
104. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Interior, Fed. Water Pollution Control Admin., Transcript of
Conference in re Pollution of Lake Superior and its Tributary Basin in the States of Minnesota,
Wisconsin,
and
Michigan
(1969),
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi/20016W3S.PDF?Dockey=2001
6W3S.PDF
[https://perma.cc/3EPP-D62X].
105. Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 107.
106. Id. at 98–99.
107. 441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1971).
108. Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 99–101.
109. Id. at 107 n.9 (quoting Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d at 241).
110. Id. at 107.
111. Id. at 107–08.
112. Id. at 107.
113. Id. at 108 (footnote omitted).
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jurisdiction. In Vermont v. New York,114 the Court appointed a Special
Master, who was able to negotiate a settlement between the parties
involving a paper mill in New York.115 However, the Court stunned the
parties in June 1974 by refusing to approve a proposed consent decree.116
The Court explained that it did not want to assume continuing
responsibility for supervising implementation of a consent decree in the
absence of any law to apply.117 This “would materially change the function
of the Court in these interstate contests” to one of performing arbitral
rather than judicial functions.118
In sum, the Supreme Court’s rulings in Milwaukee I and Vermont v.
New York demonstrated that it was growing increasingly weary of
exercising its original jurisdiction in such complex interstate nuisance
claims. And with the passage of the CWA in 1972, the Court finally had
the opportunity to rule on federal common law nuisance claims in the
context of a comprehensive federal regulatory regime. This all came to a
head in Milwaukee II, discussed below.
2. Milwaukee II (1981): Preemption and the Clean Water Act
After failing to convince the U.S. Supreme Court to hear its nuisance
action against the City of Milwaukee as an original action, Illinois re-filed
its lawsuit in federal district court in Illinois. Less than five months later,
Congress enacted the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments in
October 1972 (Clean Water Act) over President Nixon’s veto.119 This set
up a showdown over whether the common law had been preempted
because Illinois maintained that the permits issued to Milwaukee’s plants
still allowed levels of pollutant discharges that would constitute public
nuisances.120
After a six-month trial, in July 1977 the Illinois federal district court
upheld the state’s claim that Milwaukee’s discharge constituted a public
nuisance under federal common law and rejected the argument that the
new CWA permit program preempted the federal common law of
nuisance.121 It ordered the city to meet more stringent effluent limits and to
construct facilities to eliminate combined sewer overflows by 1989.122
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
816.
120.
121.
122.

Vermont v. New York, 417 U.S. 270 (1974) (per curiam).
Id. at 270–71.
Id. at 274.
Id. at 277.
Id.
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92–500, 86 Stat.
Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. 304, 310–11 (1981).
Id. at 311.
Id. at 311–12.
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On appeal the Seventh Circuit recognized the comprehensiveness of the
CWA’s new regulatory program for controlling pollution;123 however, it
still affirmed the district court’s holding that federal common law was not
pre-empted.124 The court noted that § 510 of the CWA125 preserves the
authority of states to adopt more stringent standards than required by the
CWA, and it cited § 511’s directive that the CWA not be construed to
limit the federal authority, to include federal common law.126 The court
also noted that the savings clause in the citizen suit provision of the
CWA127 expressly preserved any common law claims, which it interpreted
to include both state and federal common law.128 While concluding that
the district court had failed to justify imposing more stringent effluent
limits for certain pollutants, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district
court’s order to eliminate combined sewer overflows and to impose a new
limit on phosphorus discharges.129
When Milwaukee sought review of the Seventh Circuit’s decision by
the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court initially voted to deny review.130
However, after Justice White drafted a dissent from denial of certiorari
questioning the competence of courts to impose effluent limits stricter than
those required in existing permits,131 the Court agreed to hear the case.132
At oral argument the Solicitor General appeared as an amicus supporting
Illinois’s position that the CWA did not preempt the federal common law
of nuisance.133 But in April 1981 the Court held that the Act had
preempted federal common law when it finally decided Milwaukee II.134
In an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, the Court noted that legislative
preemption of federal common law did not implicate the same federalism
concerns that require clear expressions of congressional intent before state
123. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151, 162 (7th Cir. 1979), vacated, Milwaukee II, 451 U.S.
at 304.
124. Illinois, 599 F.2d at 162, 177.
125. 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (2012).
126. Illinois, 599 F.2d at 162; 33 U.S.C. § 1371.
127. Clean Water Act § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2012).
128. Illinois, 599 F.2d at 163.
129. Id. at 177.
130. Memorandum from Justice Byron R. White circulating Draft Dissent from Denial of
Certiorari (Mar. 3, 1980) (on file with Library of Congress).
131. In his draft dissent Justice White noted that he did “not necessarily disagree with the
decision below,” but “that there is substantial doubt as to whether Congress intended that inexpert
federal courts, guided by principles of common-law nuisance and maxims of equity jurisprudence,
could impose environmental duties stricter than those adopted through democratic processes and
developed by supposedly expert federal and state agencies.” Justice White expressed the fear that
“many interstate bodies of water . . . could become the subject of federal common-law nuisance
actions.” Id.
132. 445 U.S. 926 (1980) (mem.).
133. Id. at 307.
134. Id. at 304.
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law may be preempted.135 Justice Rehnquist interpreted the language of §
505(e) narrowly to mean:
[T]hat nothing in § 505, the citizen-suit provision, should be read as
limiting any other remedies which might exist. . . . [I]t means only
that the provision of such suit does not revoke other remedies. It
most assuredly cannot be read to mean that the [CWA] as a whole
does not supplant formerly available federal common-law actions
but only that the particular section authorizing citizen suits does not
do so.136
Citing the comprehensive nature of the CWA’s regulatory scheme and the
technical complexities courts would have to confront to formulate
pollution control standards, Justice Rehnquist concluded that Congress
implicitly had supplanted federal common law by adopting a
comprehensive regulatory scheme for water pollution control.137 Justice
Rehnquist concluded that “[t]he establishment of such a self-consciously
comprehensive program by Congress, which certainly did not exist when
Illinois v. Milwaukee was decided, strongly suggests that there is no room
for courts to attempt to improve on that program with federal common
law.”138 He went on to note that application of federal common law would
be
peculiarly inappropriate in areas as complex as water pollution
control. . . . Not only are the technical problems difficult—doubtless
the reason Congress vested authority to administer the [CWA] in
administrative agencies possessing the necessary expertise—but the
general area is particularly unsuited to the approach inevitable under
a regime of federal common law. Congress criticized past
approaches to water pollution control as being “sporadic” and “ad
hoc,” apt characterizations of any judicial approach applying federal
common law.139
Justice Rehnquist noted that Illinois was free to pursue its case for more
stringent controls on Milwaukee’s discharges before the Wisconsin state
agency responsible for issuing Milwaukee a permit under the CWA.140 But
he maintained that “[i]t would be quite inconsistent with this scheme if
federal courts were . . . to ‘write their own ticket’ under the guise of

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 316–17.
Id. at 328–29.
Id. at 317–19.
Id. at 319 (citing Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236, 241 (10th Cir. 1971)).
Id. at 325 (citations omitted).
Id. at 326.
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federal common law after permits have already been issued and permittees
have been planning and operating in reliance on them.”141
In dissent, Justice Blackmun, joined by two other Justices, argued that
the savings clause and legislative history of the Act clearly expressed
intent by Congress to not preempt federal common law.142 While
conceding that interstate nuisance cases often are complex, Blackmun
argued, “[T]hey do not require courts to perform functions beyond their
traditional capacities or experience.”143 He concluded that the Court’s
decision was particularly unfortunate because it would undermine efforts
to promote “a more uniform federal approach to the problem of alleviating
interstate pollution . . . .”144
Milwaukee II’s impact was immediate as applied to analogous federal
regulatory regimes. Two months after its decision in Milwaukee II, the
Court held that the Ocean Dumping Act’s permit scheme pre-empted
federal common law.145 In Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v.
National Sea Clammers Ass’n, the Court concluded that regulating
discharges to such waters146 displaced the federal common law of nuisance
because it “is no less comprehensive, with respect to ocean dumping, than
are analogous provisions” in the CWA.147
Two decades later, when it rejected Exxon’s claim that the CWA
preempted private claims for punitive damages for pollution caused by the
Exxon Valdez spill, the Court distinguished Milwaukee II and National
Sea Clammers.148 The Court described these as cases “where plaintiffs’
common law nuisance claims amounted to arguments for effluentdischarge standards different from those provided by the CWA.”149 The
“private claims for economic injury” in the Exxon Valdez litigation “do
not threaten similar interference with federal regulatory goals,” the Court
explained.150
But Milwaukee II did not eliminate all common law nuisance actions.
Left unresolved was the question of whether the CWA preempts state
common law nuisance actions. This would have to wait for the Court’s
decision in International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, which has important

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
1052.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id.
Id. at 332, 338–39 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 349.
Id. at 353.
Middlesex Cty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 22 (1981).
Marine Protection Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-532, 86 Stat.
Nat’l Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 22.
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008).
Id. at 489 n.7.
Id.
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significance for future climate-change common law state nuisance claims,
as discussed below.
3. International Paper Co. v. Ouellette (1987): The Court Preserves
State Common Law Claims
In 1987, six years after Milwaukee II was decided, the Supreme Court
decided International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, re-affirming the viability of
state common law nuisance claims.151 In Ouellette, the Court held that the
CWA did not preempt state common law so long as the law of the source
state was applied.152 Ouellette involved a private nuisance action brought
by lakeshore property owners in Vermont state court against the same
paper mill that had spawned Vermont v. New York.153 The defendant
removed the action to federal court, asserting that the CWA preempted the
state common law claim in light of the Milwaukee II decision.154
In Ouellette, the Solicitor General again appeared as an amicus to
support the plaintiffs’ position that the CWA did not preempt state
common law actions.155 The Court agreed, but five Justices insisted that in
transboundary nuisance cases only the common law of the source state
could apply.156 The papers of the late Justice Thurgood Marshall indicate
that these Justices struggled mightily to come up with a legal justification
for this conclusion, which was largely a product of what they thought
would represent good policy.157
Justice Powell’s majority opinion ultimately rested preemption of the
receiving state’s common law on the fear that downstream states could
interfere with the goals of the CWA by dictating unreasonably stringent
and potentially conflicting standards on upstream sources.158 But he
concluded that “nothing in the Act bars aggrieved individuals from
bringing a nuisance claim pursuant to the law of the source State,” citing
151. Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
152. Id. at 498–500.
153. Id. at 484.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 498.
156. Id. at 498–500.
157. Robert V. Percival, Environmental Law in the Supreme Court: Highlights from the
Marshall Papers, 23 ENVTL. L. REP. 10606, 10618 (1993). Justice Powell, who had been assigned the
task of drafting the majority opinion, had sent the other Justices an unusual memo asking for ideas
concerning how to reach this result. Memorandum to the Conference from Justice Powell (Nov. 17,
1986) (on file with the Library of Congress). Justice Scalia proposed the idea of interpreting
Milwaukee I as implicitly preempting state common law by recognizing that the federal courts could
apply federal common law in interstate nuisance disputes. He proposed that the Court then declare that
Congress, by adopting the CWA, had resuscitated state common law, but only when the law of source
states was applied. Memorandum to the Conference from Justice Scalia (Nov. 18, 1986) (on file with
the Library of Congress).
158. Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 494–96.
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the express preservation of the right of states to impose more stringent
standards on their own point sources in the Act’s savings clause.159 The
four dissenters criticized any preemption of state common law and argued
that federal courts should apply normal choice-of-law principles when
hearing state common law actions over interstate pollution.160
The Table below displays the core environmental common law
nuisance claims throughout the twentieth century and where state and
federal common law nuisance claims stood at the beginning of the twentyfirst century:
Table 1: The Evolution of Twentieth Century Interstate Nuisance Claims
Case

Year

Federal Common Law
Public Nuisance
Claims?
1906 Missouri had failed to
prove sufficient causal
injury

State Common Law
Public Nuisance
Claims?
Not specifically
addressed

Georgia v.
Tennessee
Copper

1907 States have important
“quasi-sovereign”
interests

Not specifically
addressed

Milwaukee I

1972 Not displaced prior to
enactment of
comprehensive CWA

Not specifically
addressed

Milwaukee II

1981 CWA has displaced
such claims

Not specifically
addressed

International
Paper Co. v.
Ouellette

1987 Not specifically
addressed

Allowed as long as the
law of the source state
is preserved

Missouri v.
Illinois

159. Id. at 497; 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (2012) (“Statutory or common law rights not restricted—
Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any person (or class of persons) may have under
any statute or common law to seek enforcement of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any
other relief (including relief against the Administrator or a State agency).”).
160. Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 501–02 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 509 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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II. COMMON LAW CLIMATE LITIGATION
At the dawn of the twenty-first century, the Supreme Court was
effectively out of the business of utilizing its original jurisdiction to hear
interstate pollution disputes. It was widely assumed that the CAA
Amendments of 1990, which added a comprehensive federal permit
program to the CAA, would also displace federal common law nuisance
actions for interstate air pollution whenever a court was forced squarely to
confront such a case.161 But the CAA’s express preemption clause only
covers motor vehicle-related claims—it does not expressly address nonmotor vehicle-related claims.162 And under Ouellette, state common law
nuisance actions for transboundary pollution remained alive so long as the
law of the source state was applied.163 It was not until more than two
decades later when the Supreme Court addressed the CAA regulatory
regime in the context of federal common law nuisance claims in AEP.
A. AEP v. Connecticut in District Court: An Initial Test for Common Law
Nuisance Claims Under the Clean Air Act
In July 2004 eight states and the City of New York filed a federal and
state common law nuisance action against five of the largest electric

161. The Ninth Circuit in National Audubon Society v. Department of Water, 869 F.2d 1196 (9th
Cir. 1989), held that the CWA preempts a federal common law nuisance action against the Los
Angeles Department of Water and Power for damage it caused by diverting water from Mono Lake,
but it reserved judgment on the question whether the federal CAA would preempt a federal common
law nuisance action against the Department for air pollution. The Ninth Circuit held that a federal
common law action was not available under the facts of the case because, unlike the situation in
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., there was no interstate dispute involved. Id. at 1204–05. A
dissenting judge argued that there is a uniquely federal interest in preserving air quality even in
intrastate disputes. Id. at 1208–09 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). Even before the 1990 CAA Amendments
were adopted, some lower federal courts had suggested that the CAA could preempt federal common
law nuisance actions for interstate air pollution. See United States v. Kin-Buc, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 699
(D.N.J 1982); New England Legal Found. v. Costle, 666 F.2d 30, 32 n.2 (2d Cir. 1981).
162. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2012).
163. Professor Daniel Farber has described the significance of Ouellette for the vitality of
common law nuisance actions in the following terms: “after hanging by its fingernails from a cliff in
Milwaukee II, the common law came roaring back in the final episode.” DANIEL A. FARBER, The Story
of Boomer: Pollution and the Common Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES 7, 40 (Richard J.
Lazarus & Oliver A. Houck eds., 2005). The requirement that the state common law of the source state
be applied did not significantly disadvantage the plaintiffs in Ouellette. On remand, New York
nuisance law proved no more favorable to the paper company than Vermont’s would have been. The
company ultimately settled with the plaintiffs for five million dollars, including the establishment of a
trust fund for environmental projects in the Lake Champlain area. The colorful story of this litigation is
recounted by Peter Langrock, the plaintiffs’ lawyer, in PETER LANGROCK, ADDISON COUNTY JUSTICE:
TALES FROM A VERMONT COURTHOUSE 69–86 (1997).
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utilities in the United States.164 The suit alleged that power plants operated
by the defendant utilities contribute 10 percent of U.S. emissions of carbon
dioxide (CO2), a greenhouse gas that contributes to global warming and
climate change.165 The plaintiff further claimed that global warming
already had begun to alter the climate of the United States and that it was
causing significant harm to them.166 In their lawsuit, they sought an order
holding the defendants jointly and severally liable for contributing to
global warming and an injunction ordering the companies to cap their
emissions of CO2 and then to reduce them by a specified percentage each
year for at least a decade.167
The case raised the question of whether the CAA preempts the federal
common law of nuisance for interstate air pollution.168 While the CAA
was amended in 1990 to add a comprehensive permit program similar to
the CWA, at the time the lawsuit was filed the CAA had not been used to
regulate CO2. During the George W. Bush Administration, EPA’s general
counsel asserted that the agency lacked the authority to regulate CO2
emissions under the CAA.169
On September 15, 2005, Federal District Judge Loretta Preska
dismissed the states’ lawsuit without reaching the critical preemption
issue.170 Instead, she held that the case presented non-justiciable political
questions.171 In doing so, she distinguished previous interstate nuisance
cases like Georgia v. Tennessee Copper and New Jersey v. New York City,
by noting that none “has touched on so many areas of national and
international policy” as the climate change litigation,172 stating:
The explicit statements of Congress and the Executive on the issue
of global climate change in general and their specific refusal to
impose the limits on carbon dioxide emissions Plaintiffs now seek
to impose by judicial fiat confirm that making the “initial policy
determination[s]” addressing global climate change is an
undertaking for the political branches.173

164. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 267–68 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), rev’d,
564 U.S. 410 (2011). The five states included Connecticut, New York, California, Iowa, New Jersey,
Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin. Id.
165. Id. at 268.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 270.
168. Id.
169. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 512 (2007).
170. 406 F. Supp. 2d at 265.
171. Id. at 274.
172. Id. at 272.
173. Id. at 274 (alteration in original).
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Judge Preska further noted that “[b]ecause resolution of the issues
presented here requires identification and balancing of economic,
environmental, foreign policy, and national security interests,” the case
“present[s] non-justiciable political questions that are consigned to the
political branches, not the Judiciary.”174
Judge Preska’s decision was appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, which heard oral argument in June 2006. But the
appellate court put the case on hold while waiting for the U.S. Supreme
Court to decide Massachusetts v. EPA, a case that challenged the George
W. Bush Administration’s authority to regulate emissions of GHGs under
the CAA.175
B. The Intervening Ruling in Massachusetts v. EPA (2007) and the Second
Circuit’s Subsequent Ruling in AEP v. Connecticut (2009)
In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court in a closely decided 5–4 held that
climate change sufficiently affected the state of Massachusetts to give it
standing to challenge EPA’s failure to regulate emissions of GHGs. 176 On
the merits, the Court held that EPA did have the authority to regulate
emissions of GHGs under the CAA if it found that they “endanger” public
health or welfare by contributing to global warming and climate change.177
The Court remanded the case to EPA to consider whether to make an
“endangerment finding.”178
The Court’s decision, written by Justice Stevens, relied heavily on
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., the century-old nuisance case discussed
in Part I. Despite not being cited in any of the many briefs filed with the
174. Id.
175. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 527–28.
178. Id. at 534–35. The Administrative Procedure Act grants the public the right to petition
agencies for the issuance of rules. 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (“Each agency shall give an interested person the
right to petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule.”). While agencies have an obligation
to respond to these petitions, in practice they often are ignored for many years and it is extremely
difficult to establish that a failure to respond is agency action “unreasonably delayed” that can be
redressed by judicial review. See, e.g., Telecomms. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70 (D.C.
Cir. 1984). Indeed, the landmark Massachusetts v. EPA litigation never would have made it through
the courthouse doors except for the fact that the Bush Administration wanted to trumpet its new policy
decision that EPA did not have the authority to regulate GHG emissions under the CAA. It thus seized
upon a petition from an obscure NGO asking EPA to conduct a rulemaking on GHG emissions from
mobile sources and denied it to emphasize the new policy. EPA Press Release, EPA Denies Petition to
Regulate Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Motor Vehicles, August 28, 2003,
https://archive.epa.gov/epapages/newsroom_
archive/newsreleases/694c8f3b7c16ff6085256d900065fdad.html. Had that not happened, the petition
probably could still be sitting at EPA unanswered and Massachusetts v. EPA never would have made it
to court.
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Court,179 Justice Stevens turned to Justice Holmes’s century-old reasoning
on the status of states in interstate nuisance claims, re-affirming that,
“[w]ell before the creation of the modern administrative state, we
recognized that States are not normal litigants for the purposes of invoking
federal jurisdiction.”180 He further noted, “Just as Georgia’s independent
interest ‘in all the earth and air within its domain’ supported federal
jurisdiction a century ago, so too does Massachusetts’s well-founded
desire to preserve its sovereign territory today.”181
After a round of supplemental briefing on Massachusetts v. EPA’s
impact, two years elapsed before the Second Circuit panel released its
decision in AEP.182 The decision was released on September 21, 2009, just
six weeks after one of the panel’s members, Judge Sonia Sotomayor, had
been elevated to the U.S. Supreme Court.183 The remaining two judges on
the panel, Judge Hall, joined by Judge McLaughlin, issued a ninety-page
opinion that reversed Judge Preska’s decision and held that climate change
was not a non-justiciable “political question.”184 The court held that the
states had parens patriae and Article III standing, and New York City and
the land trusts who had joined the litigation had Article III standing.185 The
court also found that the CAA did not displace the plaintiffs’ common law
nuisance claim, allowing the case to go forward to trial.186

179. The first mention of the Georgia v. Tennessee Copper precedent occurred at oral argument.
Justice Kennedy suggested the case when counsel for Massachusetts was struggling to respond to a
question concerning what his “best case” was supporting the state’s standing. See Oral Argument at
14:42, Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (No. 05-1120), http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000200 9/2006/2006_05_1120 [https://perma.cc/MZN7-3YVL].
180. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 518.
181. Id. at 519 (“When a state enters the Union, it surrenders certain sovereign prerogatives.
Massachusetts cannot invade Rhode Island to force reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, it cannot
negotiate an emissions treaty with China or India . . . .”). Id.
182. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), rev’d, 564 U.S. 410
(2011).
183. Adam Liptak, Justices Rebuff States on Utilities’ Gas Emissions, N.Y. TIMES, June 21,
2011, at A18.
184. 582 F.3d at 309.
185. Id. at 392. Parens patriae means “[t]he state regarded as a sovereign; the state in its
capacity as provider of protection to those unable to care for themselves.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(7th ed. 1999). See also Zdeb, supra note 22.
186. 582 F.3d at 392. The panel usefully explained the difference between displacement and
preemption in the following terms:
[T]he concept of “displacement” refers to a situation in which “federal statutory law governs
a question previously the subject of federal common law.” The term “pre-emption,” in
contrast, generally addresses a circumstance in which a federal statute supersedes state law,
but courts have also frequently used the word “pre-emption” when discussing whether a
statute displaces federal common law. We further note that the “appropriate analysis” in
determining whether displacement of the federal common law has occurred “is not the same
as that employed in deciding if federal law pre-empts state law.”
Id. at 371 n.37 (citations omitted) (quoting Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. 304, 316 (1981)).
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The court noted that Massachusetts v. EPA made it “clear that EPA has
statutory authority to regulate greenhouse gases as a ‘pollutant’ under the
Clean Air Act.”187 The court concluded, “until EPA makes the requisite
findings, for the purposes of our displacement analysis the CAA does not
(1) regulate greenhouse gas emissions or (2) regulate such emissions from
stationary sources.”188 Thus, it concluded that the problem has not been
“thoroughly addressed” by the CAA, unlike the situation in Milwaukee II
in the context of the CWA.189 Milwaukee II addressed the viability of
federal common law water pollution nuisance claims in the aftermath of
the CWA’s passage.190 The Court in Milwaukee II found that the CWA
supplanted federal common law when Congress adopted a comprehensive
regulatory scheme for water pollution control.191 The CAA presents a
more difficult problem—the extent to which Congress has delegated to the
EPA the ability to regulate greenhouse gas emissions. Hence, the Second
Circuit found that “neither Congress nor EPA has regulated greenhouse
gas emissions from stationary sources in such a way as to ‘speak directly’
to the ‘particular issue’ raised by Plaintiffs.”192 Thus, it concluded that the
CAA had not displaced Connecticut’s lawsuit.193
C. AEP v. Connecticut (2011): Displacing Federal Common Law Claims
but Leaving the Door Open for State Common Law Claims
The Supreme Court agreed to review the Second Circuit’s decision in
AEP.194 Numerous industry groups implored the Court to follow the
federal district court’s holding that climate change litigation raised nonjusticiable political questions or to reject the lawsuit on the grounds that
the effects of climate change were too diffuse or uncertain to give rise to
Article III standing.195 Some private nuisance actions had been filed
against oil companies seeking damages for their contribution to climate
change and many defendants hoped the Supreme Court would preclude all
such litigation on constitutional grounds. The Solicitor General,

187. Id. at 378.
188. 582 F.3d at 381. The endangerment finding was made in December 2009. Endangerment
and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act,
74 Fed. Reg. 66,495 (Dec. 15, 2009).
189. Id. (quoting Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. 304, 320 (1981)).
190. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. 304, 310–12 (1981).
191. Id. at 317–19.
192. 582 F.3d at 387.
193. Id. at 387–88.
194. AEP, 564 U.S. 410 (2011).
195. A total of twenty amicus briefs supporting the utility defendants were filed by various
groups, including trade associations representing the utility, oil, auto, chemical, and construction
industries. Id. at 414–15.
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representing the Tennessee Valley Authority, argued that the Court should
dismiss the case not for lack of Article III standing, but for lack of
prudential standing because the global nature of climate change is a
generalized grievance best addressed by the political branches of
government.196 Due to the recusal of the recently appointed Justice Sonia
Sotomayor, only eight Justices heard the case.197 The four key components
of the ruling are discussed below.
First, by a split 4–4 vote, the Court affirmed the Second Circuit’s
rejection of arguments that (1) the plaintiffs lacked standing and that (2)
the case raised a non-justiciable political question.198 The Court stated that
four of its members “would hold that at least some plaintiffs have Article
III standing under Massachusetts [v. EPA], which permitted a State to
challenge EPA’s refusal to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, and,
further, that no other threshold obstacle bars review” including the
political question doctrine and the Solicitor General’s argument that the
case should be dismissed because of a prudential bar to adjudicating
generalized grievances.199 Four other Justices—likely the dissenters in
Massachusetts v. EPA—“would hold that none of the plaintiffs have
Article III standing.”200
Second, in her opinion for the otherwise unanimous Court, Justice
Ginsburg addressed the propriety of federal courts fashioning federal
common law in the area of environmental protection.201 Citing Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, she explained: “The ‘new’ federal common law
addresses ‘subjects within national legislative power where Congress has
so directed’ or where the basic scheme of the Constitution so demands.”202
Justice Ginsburg declared that “[e]nvironmental protection is undoubtedly
an area ‘within national legislative power,’ one in which federal courts
may fill in ‘statutory interstices,’ and, if necessary, even ‘fashion federal

196. See Brief for Tennessee Valley Authority as Respondent Supporting Petitioners at 14–24,
AEP, 564 U.S. 410 (2011) (No. 10-174).
197. Justice Sonia Sotomayor recused herself because she had been on the Second Circuit panel
that initially heard oral argument in the case, although she was elevated to the Supreme Court before
the Second Circuit released its decision with the two remaining judges on the panel agreeing to reverse
the district court. See, e.g., Lawrence Hurley, Supreme Court Takes up Climate “Nuisance” Case,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
6,
2010),
https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/12/06/06greenwire-supreme-court-takesup-climate-nuisance-case-71478.html?emc=rss&pagewanted=all&partner=rss (noting that Justice
Sotomayer had recused herself from hearing the case).
198. AEP, 564 U.S. at 419–420.
199. Id. at 420 & n.6 (citation omitted).
200. Id. at 420.
201. Id. at 420–23.
202. Id. at 421 (quoting Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of the New Federal Common
Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 422 (1964)).
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law.’”203 She quoted the statement in Milwaukee I that “[w]hen we deal
with air and water in their ambient or interstate aspects, there is a federal
common law.”204
Justice Ginsburg then noted that the Court had never decided whether
private citizens or political subdivisions (e.g., cities, municipalities) could
use the federal common law of nuisance to seek redress for interstate
pollution.205 “Nor have we ever held that a State may sue to abate any and
all manner of pollution originating outside its borders.”206 Justice Ginsburg
noted that the defendants sought to distinguish this case from previous
interstate nuisance cases because of the “scale and complexity” of climate
change.207 But, citing Justice Holmes’s recognition of the germ theory of
disease in Missouri v. Illinois, she observed, “[P]ublic nuisance law, like
common law generally, adapts to changing scientific and factual
circumstances.”208
On the critical federal common law displacement issue, the Court held
“that the Clean Air Act and the EPA actions it authorizes displace any
federal common-law right to seek abatement of carbon-dioxide emissions
from fossil-fuel fired powerplants [sic].”209 The test for displacement “is
simply whether the statute ‘speaks[s] directly to [the] question’ at issue,”
the Court declared, and the CAA “‘speaks directly’ to emissions of carbon
dioxide” from power plants.210 While EPA had yet to finish its
endangerment rulemaking, the Court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that
federal common law is not displaced until EPA actually exercises its
authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions.211
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion explained that the “critical point is that
Congress delegated to EPA the decision whether and how to regulate
carbon-dioxide emissions from powerplants [sic]; the delegation is what
displaces federal common law.”212 Further, “were EPA to decline to
regulate carbon-dioxide emissions altogether at the conclusion of its
ongoing § 7411 rulemaking, the federal courts would have no warrant to
employ the federal common law of nuisance to upset the Agency’s expert

203. Id. (quoting Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of the New Federal Common Law, 39
N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 421 (1964)).
204. Id. (quoting Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. 91, 103 (1972)).
205. Id. at 422.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 423 (citing Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 522 (1906)).
209. Id. at 424.
210. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625
(1978)).
211. Id. at 425–26.
212. Id. at 426 (emphasis added).

469

470

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 96:441

determination.”213 Justice Ginsburg took pains to emphasize that EPA, as
the expert administrative agency entrusted by Congress with the task of
controlling air pollution, “is surely better equipped to do the job than
individual district judges issuing ad hoc, case-by-case injunctions.”214
Third, in critical language with widespread implications for future
climate change-related litigation, she emphasized that a future EPA
decision to not regulate CO2 emissions “would not escape judicial
review”215 and that “EPA may not decline to regulate carbon-dioxide
emissions from powerplants [sic] if refusal to act would be ‘arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law.’”216 The order of decision-making prescribed by Congress—“the first
decider under the Act is the expert administrative agency, the second,
federal judges”—is fitting because the “appropriate amount of regulation
in any particular greenhouse gas-producing sector cannot be prescribed in
a vacuum.”217
Nonetheless, Justice Ginsburg emphasized the critical role that federal
courts have in overseeing EPA’s actions—just not in the first instance.
While the federal courts “would have no warrant to employ the federal
common law of nuisance to upset the Agency’s expert determination,”
such a determination would still be subject to the Administrative
Procedure Act.218 While EPA can establish emissions standards for GHGs
that, “‘in [the Administrator’s] judgment,’ ‘caus[e], or contribut[e]
significantly to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to
endanger public health or welfare . . . . ‘[t]he use of the word judgment . . .
is not a roving license.”219 Any refusal to regulate carbon-dioxide
emissions remains subject to the citizen suit provisions of the CAA and a
refusal to act must not be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law.”220 In sum, Justice Ginsburg called
attention to potential future litigation in the event that EPA decides to not
regulate GHG emissions at the conclusion of the rulemaking process. 221 In
light of this language for a unanimous Court, it seems likely that the
Supreme Court would closely scrutinize any decision by the Trump EPA
213. Id.
214. Id. at 428.
215. Id. at 426.
216. Id. at 427 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9)(A)).
217. Id.
218. Id. at 426.
219. Id. at 426–27 (alterations in original) (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(A) and Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 533 (2007)).
220. Id. at 427 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9)(A)).
221. “If the plaintiffs in this case are dissatisfied with the outcome of EPA’s forthcoming
rulemaking, their recourse under federal law is to seek Court of Appeals review, and, ultimately, to
petition for certiorari in this Court.” Id.
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to reverse the endangerment finding.
Fourth, Justice Ginsburg specifically reserved judgment on the question
whether state common law nuisance actions were preempted by the CAA,
noting that it was a question that had not been briefed or argued.222
Although preemption of state common law was not a question presented to
the Court, she affirmatively cited Ouellette’s holding that the CWA did
not preempt such suits when the law of the source state was applied,223
thus leaving the door open for future state law suits. Justice Alito, joined
by Justice Thomas, filed the following concurrence “I concur in the
judgment, and I agree with the Court’s displacement analysis on the
assumption (which I make for the sake of argument because no party
contends otherwise) that the interpretation of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7401 et seq., adopted by the majority in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S.
497 (2007), is correct.” The two still contest the Court’s holding in
Massachusetts.
In sum, the Supreme Court’s decision in AEP confirmed that the CAA
broadly displaced the federal common law of nuisance for climate changerelated claims by delegating to EPA the responsibility for developing a
regulatory response to the problem. In doing so, it rejected efforts to erect
constitutional obstacles to climate litigation (such as the political question
doctrine) even as it blocked the use of federal common law actions. The
Supreme Court also affirmed that states have standing to sue, reaffirming
the historical role that the Court has played in resolving environmental
disputes between states.224 By briefly addressing the viability of future
state law litigation, the Court at least kept the door open for future climate
litigation.
III. FEDERAL COMMON LAW IN THE WAKE OF AEP V. CONNECTICUT
The rationale for displacement of federal common law in AEP was that
the CAA delegated to EPA the responsibility to prevent harm from climate
change.225 The lower federal courts have addressed displacement issues in
the two decisions discussed below. The Seventh Circuit has held that
transboundary environmental problems, such as invasive species, not
directly addressed by the CWA can still serve as the basis for a federal
common law action.226 The Ninth Circuit has dismissed a federal common

222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Id. at 429.
Id.
Id. at 509–10.
Id. at 424–26.
Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 667 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2011).
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law action seeking damages from fossil fuel industries due to harm caused
by climate change.227
A. Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers: The Seventh Circuit
Confirms the Role of the Common Law as a Regulatory Backstop
The continued viability of federal common law as a regulatory
backstop was confirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit in Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.228 In this case, states
filed a federal common law nuisance action in an effort to stop the spread
of two invasive species of Asian carp (bighead carp and silver carp) into
the Great Lakes.229 Initially imported into the U.S. by fish farms in
Arkansas, the carp escaped to the Mississippi River and worked their way
upstream to the Chicago Sanitary and Ship Canal—the very canal that
gave rise to the Missouri v. Illinois case—from which it is feared they will
enter Lake Michigan and spread throughout the Great Lakes.230
After failing to persuade the U.S. Supreme Court to act, five states filed
a federal public nuisance action in federal district court in Illinois on July
19, 2010.231 The suit alleged that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers had
created a public nuisance by managing the Chicago Area Waterway
System (CAWS) in a manner that would allow the Asian carp to reach the
Great Lakes.232 The states asked the court to issue an injunction requiring
the closing of the CAWS locks and requiring the Corps to develop a plan
to permanently separate the carp-infested Chicago River from Lake
Michigan.233 The Corps noted that to date Congress had directed the Corps
only to study options for preventing the transfer of invasive aquatic
species between the two basins.234

227. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012).
228. 667 F.3d at 765.
229. See id. at 768–69. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service has designated one species of Asian
carp—the silver carp—as an injurious species, 50 C.F.R. § 16.13(a)(2)(v)(D) (2017), making it a
federal crime under the Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. § 3372, to transport them into or around the United
States. Injurious Wildlife Species; Silver Carp (Hypophthelmichthys molitrix) and Largescale Silver
Carp (Hypophthelmichthys harmandi), 72 Fed. Reg. 37,459 (July 10, 2007). A similar listing for
bighead carp remains under review.
230. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 667 F.3d at 768. The carp, which can grow to sixty pounds or
more, “are voracious eaters that consume small organisms on which the entire food chain relies; they
crowd out native species as they enter new environments; they reproduce at a high rate; they travel
quickly and adapt readily; and they have a dangerous habit of jumping out of the water and harming
people and property.” U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 667 F.3d at 768; see also Michigan v. U.S. Army
Corps of Eng’rs, No. 10–CV–4457, 2010 WL 5018559, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 2, 2010).
231. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 2010 WL 5018559, at *1 & n.1.
232. Id. at *3–4.
233. Id. at *1–2.
234. Id. at *11.
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Despite upholding the right of the Great Lakes states to bring a federal
nuisance action, Judge Dow denied their request for a preliminary
injunction.235 He concluded that while the potential damage to the Great
Lakes was high, the level of certainty that any damage will occur is low.236
He also noted that judicial restraint was in order because “multiple federal
and state agencies are expending significant effort carrying out their
statutory and regulatory duties to maintain and operate the CAWS, study
and address the threat of Asian carp, and take whatever emergency
measures they deem appropriate to prevent Asian carp ‘from dispersing
into the Great Lakes.’”237
The plaintiff States appealed Judge Dow’s ruling to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. In July 2011, while the appeal was
pending, the Corps of Engineers released a list of forty aquatic invasive
species that it believes pose the greatest risk of migrating through the
CAWS.238 This list included thirty species, including zebra mussels, that
pose a significant risk to the Mississippi River Basin and ten, including the
Asian carp, that threaten the Great Lakes.239 This study helped mobilize a
bipartisan coalition of state attorneys general to lobby Congress to require
permanent ecological separation between the Great Lakes and Mississippi
River basins.240
On August 24, 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
upheld the district court decision refusing to require the Corps to take
additional action to control Asian carp.241 Although it denied the states the
relief they requested, the court affirmed their right to use the federal
common law of nuisance to address the threat posed by the Asian carp,
while reserving the question whether a state can bring a public nuisance
claim against a federal agency.242 The court became the first U.S. Court of
Appeals to assess the impact of the Supreme Court’s AEP decision on the
federal common law of nuisance.
The Seventh Circuit panel, in an opinion by Judge Diane Wood,
rejected the defendants’ arguments that nuisance actions must be confined
to traditional pollutants:243

235.
236.
237.
238.

Id. at *34.
Id. at *30.
Id.
See Schuette Building National Coalition Against Aquatic Invasive Species,
MICHIGAN.GOV (Aug. 31, 2011), http://www.michigan.gov/som/0,4669,7-192-26847-261562-,00.html [https://perma. cc/BYL2-69R6].
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 667 F.3d 765, 769 (7th Cir. 2011).
242. Id.
243. Id. at 771.

473

474

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 96:441

While it may be true that the introduction of an invasive species of
fish into a new ecosystem does not fit the concept of nuisance as
neatly as a spill of toxic chemicals into a stream, we do not think the
Supreme Court has limited the concept of public nuisance as much
as the defendants suggest.244
Further, the court declared that “[i]t would be arbitrary to conclude that
this type of action extends to the harm caused by industrial pollution but
not to the environmental and economic destruction caused by the
introduction of an invasive, non-native organism into a new ecosystem . . .
.”245
Relying on the statement in AEP that “the delegation is what
displaces,” the Corps of Engineers and the City of Chicago argued that the
Supreme Court had created a new and more expansive test for
displacement: federal common law is displaced once Congress indicates
its intention to delegate a particular problem to an executive agency.246
The Seventh Circuit panel rejected this argument.247 It concluded that “the
Court did not establish a new test based solely on Congress’s delegation of
regulatory power; it simply pointed out that delegation is one type of
congressional action that is evidence of displacement.”248 It stressed that in
AEP the Supreme Court emphasized the comprehensive nature of the
CAA even with respect to regulation of greenhouse gas emissions, the
multiple avenues for public and private enforcement, and the right of the
public to seek judicial review of denials of petitions for rulemakings.249
In contrast to the CAA’s provisions, “congressional efforts to curb the
migration of invasive species, and of invasive carp in particular, have yet
to reach the level of detail one sees in the air or water pollution
schemes.”250 The court surveyed existing federal legislation on invasive
species.251 The Seventh Circuit panel concluded that “[a]lthough this
legislation demonstrates that Congress is aware of the problem of invasive
species generally, and carp in particular, it falls far short” of the provisions
of the CAA or CWA that were found to displace federal common law.252
The court noted “neither the Corps nor any other agency has been
empowered actively to regulate the problem of invasive carp, and
Congress has not required any agency to establish a single standard to deal
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 777 (quoting AEP, 564 U.S. 410, 426 (2011)).
Id.
Id. at 777–78.
Id. at 778.
Id. at 778–79.
Id.
Id. at 780.
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with the problem or to take any other action.”253 It also emphasized that no
enforcement mechanism has been created by Congress that would give
parties adversely affected by the carp recourse to the courts.254 Thus, the
court concluded that federal common law had not been displaced.255
While ultimately finding that it was not an abuse of discretion in the
lower court’s decision to not issue a preliminary injunction, the court took
issue with Judge Dow’s assessment of the risks posed by the carp.256 The
court believed that the plaintiffs demonstrated “a good or perhaps even a
substantial likelihood of harm—that is, a non-trivial chance that the carp
will invade Lake Michigan in numbers great enough to constitute a public
nuisance.”257
The Seventh Circuit ruled that AEP did not entirely displace the federal
common law of nuisance to address all transboundary environmental
problems. The court upheld use of the federal common law of interstate
nuisance to address the threat to the Great Lakes posed by invasive species
of Asian carp.258 After holding that the concept of interstate nuisance was
sufficiently broad to embrace the spread of invasive species, the court
rejected claims that AEP had relaxed the test for finding displacement.259 It
is not enough that Congress indicates its intention to delegate a particular
problem to an executive agency, the Seventh Circuit panel stated.260
Rather, delegation is only “one type of congressional action that is
evidence of displacement.”261 Even though Congress had mentioned the
invasive carp and directed that the problem be studied, the court concluded
that congressional awareness of a problem “falls far short” of the kind of
displacement for interstate nuisances previously found in the CWA and
CAA.262 This represents a fair reading of the AEP decision, particularly in
the context of an emerging environmental controversy not directly
addressed by existing legislation.
B. Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp.: The Ninth Circuit
Applies AEP to Dismiss Cities’ Federal Common Law Climate Claims
In Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp. the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit dismissed a federal common law nuisance
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 772.
Id. at 785.
Id. at 769.
Id. at 772–73.
Id.
Id. at 777.
Id. at 777–78.
Id. at 780.
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action brought against energy, oil and utility companies by the municipal
governments of cities located on the tip of a barrier island in Alaska.263
The cities alleged that fossil fuels produced and used by the defendants
had contributed to climate change, that the defendants conspired to
promote deliberate misrepresentation of climate change science, and that
rising sea levels ultimately would require their residents to relocate.264
They sought $400 million in damages to pay for relocation of the
villages.265
A federal district court in California initially dismissed the lawsuit on
the ground that it raised a non-justiciable political question and that
plaintiffs lacked standing.266 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit noted that AEP
reaffirmed that “federal common law can apply to transboundary pollution
suits,” which most often “are founded on a theory of public nuisance.”267
Citing AEP, the court noted that a “successful public nuisance claim
generally requires proof that a defendant’s activity unreasonably interfered
with the use or enjoyment of a public right and thereby caused the publicat-large substantial and widespread harm.”268 However, the court also
noted that “[f]ederal common law is subject to the paramount authority of
Congress.”269
The court then noted that deciding whether a federal statute displaces
federal common law “can prove complicated” because “the applicability
of displacement is an issue-specific inquiry.”270 Quoting Michigan v. U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers, the court stated that “the salient question is
‘whether Congress has provided a sufficient legislative solution to the
particular [issue] to warrant a conclusion that [the] legislation has
occupied the field to the exclusion of federal common law.’ Put more
plainly, ‘how much congressional action is enough?’”271 But the panel
concluded that “[w]e need not engage in that complex issue and factspecific analysis in this case, because we have direct Supreme Court
guidance” from the AEP decision.272 The Court in AEP had highlighted
that “Congress has directly addressed the issue of domestic greenhouse
263. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012).
264. Id. at 853–54.
265. See, e.g., Felicity Barringer, Flooded Village Files Suit, Citing Corporate Link to Climate
Change, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/27/us/27alaska.html.
266. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009), rev’d,
696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012).
267. Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 855.
268. Id. (citing Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 521 (1906); Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power
Co., 582 F. 3d 309, 357 (2d Cir. 2009)).
269. Id. at 856.
270. Id. at 856.
271. Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng’rs, 667 F.3d 765, 777 (7th Cir. 2011)).
272. Id.
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gas emissions from stationary sources and has therefore displaced federal
common law.”273
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Kivalina confirms that the federal
common law of interstate nuisance has been displaced by the CAA’s
delegation to EPA of the responsibility to control GHG emissions that
endanger public health and welfare by contributing to climate change. The
theory behind displacement is that Congress has required EPA, rather than
the courts, to respond to the problem. That is scant comfort to the citizens
of the Village of Kivalina, but it does place the onus on EPA to take action
to deal with climate change.
The table below reflects the current state of interstate nuisance
claims—to include how federal courts have treated states—in light of
Massachusetts v. EPA, AEP, and the other cases discussed above.
Table 2: Summary of Interstate Nuisance Claims from Massachusetts v.
EPA to Present
Case Name

Federal
Common Law
of Nuisance?

State Common
Law of
Nuisance?

“Special
Solicitude” to
States as
Litigants?
Reaffirmed
(quoting Georgia
v. Tennessee
Copper Co.)

Massachusetts v.
EPA

Not addressed

Not addressed

Native Village of
Kivalina v.
ExxonMobil (2012)

CAA displaces
any federal
common law
right to seek
abatement of
CO2 emissions

Not addressed

Not addressed

AEP v. Connecticut
(2011)

CAA displaces
any federal
common law
right to seek
abatement of
CO2 emissions

Discussed, but
specifically
mentioned that it
was not
preempted

Reaffirmed

Michigan v. United
States Army Corps
(2011)

Not displaced in
the context of
invasive species

Not addressed

Reaffirmed

273.

Id.
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IV. COULD OFFICIAL CLIMATE DENIAL REVIVE THE COMMON LAW?
After the Supreme Court’s Milwaukee II and AEP decisions, the federal
common law of nuisance risks being dismissed as a historical curiosity.
After all, the Court ruled in AEP that the CAA has displaced the federal
common law of nuisance for climate change claims.274 Yet if the Trump
administration repeals EPA’s endangerment finding or Congress amends
the CAA to deprive EPA of authority to regulate GHG emissions, federal
common law may no longer be displaced. Skeptics of this argument may
assert that common law nuisance litigation remains an antiquated strategy
that no longer has viability in the face of complex and comprehensive
environmental laws and regulations—regardless of what administration is
in power and what its governing policy preferences are. Yet the Court’s
reasoning in both Milwaukee II and AEP relied heavily on the regulations
being developed and implemented by an expert administrative agency.275
The Court in AEP highlighted the extent to which the Court will defer to
agency expertise.276 After all, the CAA entrusts its implementation to EPA
which, as the Court noted, is “better equipped to the job” in light of its
“scientific, economic, and technological resources.”277 What, then, if the
expert agency dismisses this scientific expertise and this resource
advantage? What level of deference should be shown by the Court? This
Part of the Article explores the consequences of the massive
environmental deregulatory efforts currently underway at the Trump EPA,
which may breathe new life into this centuries-old doctrine, forcing us to
re-conceptualize these common law claims.
A. The Enduring Legacy of the Federal Common Law of Interstate
Nuisance
Transboundary pollution problems served as a principal justification for
federalizing U.S. environmental protection law, but until recently they
have been poorly addressed by federal regulatory programs.278 Despite
agencies’ greater expertise in determining appropriate levels of pollution
control, political forces often have stymied agency action.279 For example,
274. AEP, 564 U.S. 410 (2011).
275. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. 304, 325–26 (1981); AEP, 564 U.S. at 428.
276. AEP, 564 U.S. at 428.
277. Id.
278. See Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution, 46 DUKE L.J. 931, 932
(1997) (“Notwithstanding the broad general trend toward centralized regulatory authority in
environmental law, and the widespread invocation of transboundary pollution as a justification for that
trend, little meaningful regulation of transboundary pollution actually exists.”).
279. See, e.g., Suzanne Goldenberg, The Worst of Times: Bush’s Environmental Legacy
Examined,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Jan.
16,
2009),
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the CAA has long had provisions authorizing EPA to regulate
transboundary air pollution,280 but the agency refused to use these
authorities until President Clinton’s second term.281 This history convinces
Professor Thomas Merrill that, “insofar as multi-jurisdictional air pollution
problems are concerned, some type of decisive congressional intervention
is required before effective regulatory action will be taken against the
problem.”282
During the long legislative gridlock over acid rain and interstate ozone
transport problems, environmental groups tried mightily to convince the
federal judiciary to require EPA to exercise its CAA authority to regulate
transboundary pollution. Plaintiffs repeatedly were rebuffed. Courts cited
the difficulty of proving interstate interference with attainment and
maintenance of national air quality standards given the difficulty of tracing
the transport of pollutants over long distances.283 At times they candidly
admitted their preference for greater direction from Congress concerning
how to resolve what were perceived as fierce regional conflicts.284 Yet the
very political factors that made agency officials reluctant to act, including
differential impacts on source and victim states, also made it difficult for
Congress to legislate to resolve transboundary pollution problems.285
The states that today are trying to use the common law of interstate
nuisance to prevent invasive carp from reaching the Great Lakes view
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2009/jan/16/greenpol itics-georgebush [https://perma.cc/E8JF3WSD].
280. See § 110(a)(2)(D) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D) (2016), which requires state
implementation plans (SIPs) to contain measures to ensure that in-state emissions will not “contribute
significantly to nonattainment in, or interfere with maintenance by, any other State” of any national
ambient air quality standard (NAAQS). A downwind state may petition EPA under § 126(b), 42
U.S.C. § 7426(b), for a finding that a major stationary source or group of sources is interfering with
the state’s air quality in violation of § 110. If such a finding is made, the source may not operate after
three months unless it complies with an EPA order to come into compliance within three years. §
7426(c).
281. See John H. Cushman, Jr., Clinton Sharply Tightens Air Pollution Regulations Despite
Concern over Costs, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1997, at A1.
282. Thomas W. Merrill, Global Warming as a Public Nuisance, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 293,
314 (2005).
283. See, e.g., New York v. EPA, 852 F.2d 574 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
284. In one such case, then-Circuit Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg explained, in a remarkably
candid concurring opinion, why she had refused to require EPA to act:
As counsel for the EPA acknowledged at oral argument, the EPA has taken no action against
sources of interstate air pollution under either Section 126(b) or Section 110(a)(2)(E) in the
decade-plus since those provisions were enacted. Congress, when it is so minded, is fully
capable of instructing the EPA to address particular matters promptly. . . . Congress did not
supply such direction in this instance; instead, it allowed and has left unchecked the EPA’s
current approach to interstate air pollution. The judiciary, therefore, is not the proper place in
which to urge alteration of the Agency’s course.
Id. at 581 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
285. See Richard B. Stewart, Interstate Resource Conflicts: The Role of the Federal Courts, 6
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 241, 243 (1982).
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such litigation as only one part of a much larger strategy for persuading
government actors to intervene.286 They realize that preliminary defeats in
litigation can lay the groundwork for future success in court.287 In
Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the common law nuisance
suit—while ultimately unsuccessful—may have spurred the Corps to
release a study on invasive species.288 This study served as the basis for
separate but important congressional action that addressed some of the
litigants underlying concerns.289 It is likely that the threat of losing the
common law lawsuit spurred the Corps to take action. As Michigan v. U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers reaffirmed the use of the federal common law
for certain environmental actions, the threat of losing the lawsuit—not to
mention the high costs of litigation and discovery—will continue to shine
light on environmental issues in the face of delay or inaction. The
converse also can be true, but such common law actions can engage the
federal courts and Congress “as partners in an ongoing colloquy over the
interpretation and lawfulness of statutes” with common law judgments
functioning as “an integral part of this colloquy.”290
When the regulatory and political processes fail to prevent significant
harm, the threat of common law litigation can be a useful catalyst for
286. In response to the district court’s decision denying a preliminary injunction, Nick Schroeck
of the Great Lakes Environmental Law Center stated:
This fight, however, is worth having. And to the extent that Plaintiffs can increase the federal
and state response to the crisis and expedite the completion of the hydrological separation
study (which is the real solution to Asian carp and the next invasive species, whatever it may
be) this case continues to have importance. For the rest of us who care about the Great Lakes,
we must continue to press for action from the White House and Congress. As the legal battle
over injunctions and common law public nuisance demonstrates, the current law is, at best,
inadequate and we need comprehensive federal legislation attacking aquatic invasive species
from all vectors.
Noah Hall, Another Setback in the Legal Fight to Keep Asian Carp out of the Great Lakes, GREAT
LAKES LAW (Dec. 6, 2010), http://www.greatlakeslaw.org/blog/2010/12/another-setback-in-the-legalfight-to-keep-asian-carp-out-of-the-great-lakes.html [https://perma.cc/N6VL-J8AT].
287. Thomas Cmar of the Natural Resources Defense Council states:
Judge Dow is correct that there are federal and state agencies working on this . . . most
notably the Army Corps of Engineers. The problem is that the Army Corps is working on this
far too slowly, and in the wrong way. Rather than lasering in on bold, effective action to
prevent the Asian carp from establishing a population in Lake Michigan, the Corps is
conducting a study that they think will take over 5 years and cost over $25 million—and even
then, they have not committed to deciding on an option that will fully prevent Asian carp
from moving through the CAWS, but only one that will “reduce the risk” of carp getting into
the Lake. That’s far from an adequate response, and if the White House or Congress doesn’t
step in and provide the Corps with some adult supervision, the Asian carp saga could end up
back in court—this time on a legal issue that the Corps is less likely to win.
Id.
288. See Schuette Building National Coalition Against Aquatic Invasive Species, supra note 247.
289. Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 667 F.3d 765, 779 (7th Cir. 2011). Section 1538
of the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act, Public Law 112-141
290. Ewing & Kysar, supra note 23, at 404.
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action by other branches of government.291 Clearly, the common law of
interstate nuisance has other virtues apart from the well-known deterrent
impact of tort law. Benjamin Ewing and Douglas Kysar describe the role
of the modern common law of nuisance as part of a complex mosaic of
“[o]verlapping governance mechanisms” that “help to span jurisdictions
and to marshal different fact-finding competencies, remedial powers, and
value orientations.”292 Such mechanisms help to “ensure a fuller and more
inclusive characterization of emerging threats to social and environmental
well-being.”293 They are part of what Ewing and Kysar describe as “prods
and pleas,” a kind of check against institutions that fail to perform their
assigned roles to meet societal needs.294
In the climate change context, few people expected that an interstate
nuisance action to address climate change ultimately would be
successful.295 But climate litigation—discussed in greater detail below—is
partially successful as a way to place greater pressure on companies.
Although the Supreme Court in AEP unanimously decided that the
federal common law of interstate nuisance was displaced by the CAA,296
the Justices (by a 4–4 vote) rejected pleas that they permanently bar such
litigation on constitutional (political question or standing) grounds.297
Relying on the late Judge Henry Friendly’s 1964 Benjamin Cardozo
Lecture on In Praise of Erie—and of the New Federal Common Law,298
Justice Ginsburg boldly declared that environmental protection is “an area
‘within national legislative power,’ one in which federal courts may fill in
‘statutory interstices,’ and, if necessary, even ‘fashion federal law.’”299
Citing many of the cases discussed in Part I of this paper (Missouri v.
Illinois, New Jersey v. City of New York, Georgia v. Tennessee Copper,
and Milwaukee I), Justice Ginsburg noted that the Court often has
entertained “federal common-law suits brought by one State to abate

291. But the state common law of nuisance is not without its own dangers. This action can
include not only new laws or regulatory action to address emerging or neglected problems, but also
laws to restrict the scope of state common law. UTAH CODE ANN. §78B-4-515 (LexisNexis 2018); see
also TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 382.05102 (West 2017) (insulating permitted discharges
from nuisance liability premised on climate change).
292. Ewing & Kysar, supra note 23, at 410.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 411.
295. See, e.g., Michael B. Gerrard, What Litigation of a Climate Nuisance Suit Might Look Like,
121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 135 (2011).
296. AEP, 564 U.S. 410 (2011).
297. Id. at 420.
298. Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 383 (1964).
299. AEP, 564 U.S. at 421 (quoting Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of the New
Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 421–22 (1964)).
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pollution emanating from another State.”300 She appropriately described
these cases as instances in which “States were permitted to sue to
challenge activity harmful to their citizens’ health and welfare.” 301 Thus,
the AEP Court actually endorsed the notion that protection against
interstate air and water pollution is an area where “specialized federal
common law” makes sense.
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion sheds some light on the criteria the Court
will use in determining whether regulatory legislation has displaced the
federal common law of interstate nuisance. Prior to the Court’s decision,
there had been considerable debate over the appropriate standard for
finding displacement.302 Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion in
Milwaukee II had emphasized the comprehensive nature of the CWA’s
prohibition of unpermitted discharges of water pollution.303 In AEP,
Justice Ginsburg framed the test as involving whether the regulatory
statute “speaks directly” to the emissions the plaintiffs seek to control.304
In light of the Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA that GHG
emissions could be regulated under the CAA, EPA’s subsequent
“endangerment finding,” and regulatory initiatives to control GHG
emissions, the AEP Court had no trouble finding displacement of the
federal common law.305
The Court did not provide a specific roadmap addressing how courts
are to determine whether a statute “speaks directly” to the transboundary
emissions targeted by the interstate nuisance action.306 General coverage is
probably not enough, but a Supreme Court decision like Massachusetts v.
EPA that expressly confirms such regulatory authority and requires EPA
to determine whether or not to exercise it, seems to qualify.307
Further, Justice Ginsburg’s decision discussed the judiciary’s role in
exercising judicial review over whether and how the EPA exercises this
authority.308 She noted that “[i]f EPA does not set emissions limits for a
particular pollutant or source of pollution, States and private parties may
petition for a rulemaking on the matter, and EPA’s response will be
reviewable in federal court.”309 Justice Ginsburg also notes the continual
availability of citizen suits to enforce emissions limits against regulated

300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.

Id.
Id. at 422.
See, e.g., Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. 304, 315–20 (1981).
Id. at 317–19.
AEP, 564 U.S. at 424.
Id.
Id. at 424–25.
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528–29 (2007).
AEP, 564 U.S. at 425.
Id.
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sources.310 This suggests that the judiciary should continue to play an
important oversight role. Under Justice Ginsburg’s rubric, while federal
common law may be displaced in the CAA context for now, the judiciary
will play a critical role to police any subsequent decisions by regulatory
authorities to eschew regulation.
Lastly, the Supreme Court expressly reserved judgment on the question
of whether the CAA preempts the application of state common law in
lawsuits involving interstate nuisance claims.311 Citing Ouellette, Justice
Ginsburg noted that “the availability vel non of a state lawsuit depends,
inter alia, on the preemptive effect of the federal Act.”312 Because the
issue had not been briefed or argued in the AEP litigation, the court
deferred judgment on this issue.313 Yet Ouellette made it clear that the
CWA’s displacement of the federal common law of interstate nuisance did
not displace state common law so long as the law of the source state,
rather than the law of the downwind state, was used.314
B. Why Official Climate Denial May Backfire and Revive the Common
Law
Because action by the Trump EPA to repeal EPA’s endangerment
finding would be unlikely to survive judicial review, Congress may seek
to deny EPA authority to regulate GHG emissions. This clearly would
revitalize federal common law claims because Congress no longer would
have delegated by statute responsibility to EPA to respond to the climate
change problem.315 And there are other avenues by which the door remains
open for common law nuisance claims in climate change litigation.
1. A Reversal of EPA’s “Endangerment” Finding
Even as EPA seeks to repeal its existing regulations controlling GHG
emissions, the agency’s 2009 finding that such emissions endanger public
health and welfare creates a legal obligation under the CAA for the agency
to control them. If the agency seeks to avoid this obligation by reversing
its endangerment finding, such a decision would be subject to judicial
review.316 In his testimony before the Senate Environment and Public
310. Id.
311. Id. at 429.
312. Id. (citing Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 489, 491 (1987)).
313. Id.
314. Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 489 (1987).
315. At least one law has been proposed to do just that. Within the last year, the House
considered H.R. 637, the “Stopping EPA Overreach Act of 2017,” which would exclude GHGs from
regulation under the CAA. H.R. 637, 115th Cong. (2017).
316. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
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Works Committee on January 30, 2018, then-EPA administrator Scott
Pruitt stated that he would not rule out commencing a rulemaking to
reverse the endangerment finding.317 If the agency ultimately reverses the
endangerment finding, the courts would closely scrutinize such a decision,
as Justice Ginsburg took care to highlight in AEP.318
In light of the overwhelming scientific evidence supporting EPA’s
endangerment finding, any reversal would be unlikely to survive judicial
review. This may explain the Trump Administration’s hesitance to pursue
such an action, despite its aggressive moves to repeal GHG emissions
regulations. Justice Ginsburg’s strong language in AEP suggests that the
rationale for federal common law displacement is founded in part on the
notion that the judiciary will be available to police irrational action by the
expert agency charged by law with protecting the public against air
pollutants that endanger public health or welfare.
When another administration bent on deregulation assumed office in
1981, it immediately sought to rescind a regulation requiring passive
restraints on motor vehicles. But the Supreme Court in its famous State
Farm decision held that this action was arbitrary and capricious because
the rulemaking record overwhelmingly demonstrated the life-saving
benefits of air bags.319 Because of this decision, the regulation ultimately
went into effect and hundreds of thousands of lives have been saved and
millions of serious injuries have been prevented.320 The lesson of this
history is that a new administration must have a sound factual and legal
basis for changing course or it risks having its actions overturned in court.
While agencies are often afforded great discretion regardless of the
political administration, agency decisions are not “unimpeachable.”321
Indeed, State Farm affirmed that efforts to promote the underlying policy
preferences of a new administration only go so far.322 The Court will use
the Administrative Procedure Act’s arbitrary and capricious standard if the
agency cannot articulate a satisfactory explanation for a dramatic change
in course.323 In the context of future climate litigation, the CAA delegates
great discretion to the EPA as the expert agency to regulate greenhouse
gas emissions.324 Nevertheless, the EPA must follow the rulemaking
317. DiChristopher, supra note 18.
318. See, e.g., Tom DiChristopher, Climate Change Deniers Are Plotting Trump’s Path to the
Holy Grail of Deregulation, CNBC (Nov. 22, 2017 11:15 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/22/cli
mate-change-deniers-plot-trumps-path-to-deregulation.html [https://perma.cc/5JDV-7473].
319. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
320. The full story is told in MICHAEL R. LEMOV, CAR SAFETY WARS: ONE HUNDRED YEARS
OF TECHNOLOGY, POLITICS, AND DEATH 147–74 (2015).
321. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 50.
322. Id. at 50–51.
323. Id. at 46–47.
324. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(A) (2012).
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process for the promulgation and recession of applicable rules concerning
air pollutants to include GHGs. State Farm instructs us that failure to
establish a legal and factual record to support agency action will make it
vulnerable to reversal under the APA.
In the unlikely event that a reversal of the endangerment finding was
upheld in court, would the federal common law of nuisance still be
displaced? The AEP Court expressly disagreed with the argument “that
federal common law is not displaced until EPA actually exercises its
regulatory authority, i.e., until it sets standards governing emissions from
the defendants’ plants.”325 Instead, it concluded that:
The critical point is that Congress delegated to EPA the decision
whether and how to regulate carbon-dioxide emissions from
powerplants; the delegation is what displaces federal common law.
Indeed, were EPA to decline to regulate carbon-dioxide emissions
altogether at the conclusion of its ongoing § 7411 rulemaking, the
federal courts would have no warrant to employ the federal
common law of nuisance to upset the Agency’s expert
determination.326
This indicates clearly that if reversal of an endangerment finding were
upheld in court, federal common law still would be displaced. But the
reason for this displacement would be because an expert agency had made
a decision that reviewing courts found to be supported by facts and law.
Thus, only if GHG emissions in fact do not endanger public health or
welfare can a reversal of the endangerment finding preclude common law
litigation.

2. If Congress Amends the Clean Air Act to Reverse Massachusetts v.
EPA, Federal Common Law Would Be Revived
If congressional proposals to amend the CAA to deprive EPA of its
authority to regulate GHG emissions prove successful, the core rationale
for displacement of federal common law will disappear entirely. Indeed,
the legal landscape would be fundamentally changed if the EPA was
stripped of such authority—and there have been calls to do just that. For
325.
326.

AEP, 564 U.S. 410, 425–26 (2011).
Id. at 426.
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example, House Bill 637, “Stopping EPA Overreach Act of 2017,” “would
exclude GHGs from regulation under the [CAA].”327 If this proposed
legislation or similar legislation becomes law, federal common law
nuisance claims brought by states in the fight to reduce GHG emissions
clearly would become legally viable once again. No longer would the
CAA, in the words of AEP, “delegate[] to EPA the decision whether and
how to regulate carbon-dioxide emissions from powerplants.”328 Thus,
states would be free to sue the owners of such power plants using federal
common law nuisance claims.
3. State Common Law Nuisance Claims Remain Viable
Because AEP did not address state common law nuisance claims, the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Ouellette remains good law. Thus, state
common law nuisance claims remain a possible pathway for future climate
change litigation provided that the law of the source state is applied.329
While it may seem strange to apply the common law of source states to a
global problem, there is little actual variance in the law from state to state.
In Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, 1,500 individuals who live
within a mile of a coal-fired power plant in Pennsylvania filed a class
action private nuisance action against the facility.330 They asserted several
state law tort theories, but the defendant Plant countered that because it
already “was subject to comprehensive regulation under the [CAA] it
owed no extra duty of care to the members of the Class under state tort
law.”331
Based on the savings clause and the plain language of the CAA, the
Third Circuit ruled that the CAA did not preempt source state common
law tort actions.332 In doing so, the court relied heavily on Ouellette’s
reasoning and the Court’s reliance on the CWA’s savings clause that
allowed states to impose higher standards on their own point sources.333
The defendant power plant in Bell argued that the CAA’s savings clause
did not address boundary rights and was narrower than and distinguishable

327. H.R. 637, 115th Cong. (2017); LINDA TSANG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44807, U.S.
CLIMATE CHANGE REGULATION AND LITIGATION: SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES 38 (2017).
328. 564 U.S. at 426.
329. Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, 734 F.3d 188, 196–97 (3d Cir. 2013).
330. Id. at 189.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 190.
333. Id. at 194–95. The CAA citizen suit “savings clause” states, “Nothing in this section shall
restrict any right which any person (or class of persons) may have under any statute or common law to
seek enforcement of any emission standard or limitation or to seek any other relief (including relief
against the Administrator or a State agency).” 42 U.S.C. § 7604(e) (2012).
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from that found in the CWA.334 But the court was unconvinced,
highlighting that the absence of boundary language in the CAA’s savings
clause merely indicates that “there are no such jurisdictional boundaries
or rights which apply to the air.”335 If anything, Congress intended to
preserve more rights for the states.
Although Bell v. Cheswick was a private nuisance action that did not
involve interstate pollution, it has relevance for future climate change
litigation. It reaffirms the logic in earlier cases that courts will not assume
that the powers of the state are preempted by a federal act “unless that was
the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”336
In Ouellette the Supreme Court explained that the application of the
common law of the source state would alleviate concerns that state
common law actions would interfere with the federal regulatory
infrastructure.337 However, in North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tennessee
Valley Authority, the Fourth Circuit suggested that compliance with
federal CAA regulations should insulate power plants from any state tort
action that seeks to impose “different” standards than the regulatory
scheme.338 In the North Carolina case a federal district judge had ordered
upwind, out-of-state coal-fired power plants to reduce their emissions
because they were causing a public nuisance.339 This decision was
reversed on appeal by the Fourth Circuit, which noted that the plants were
not violating existing CAA regulations.340
The Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court’s decision
improperly applied home state law extraterritorially, though this is
questionable given that there are not substantial differences in the common
law from state to state.341 While the court was careful not to contradict
Ouellette, acknowledging that “only source state law . . . could impose
more stringent emissions rates than those required by federal law,”342 it did
not specify how the nuisance law of the source states was any less

334. Bell, 734 F.3d at 195.
335. Id. See also Scott Gallisdorfer, Note, Clean Air Act Preemption of State Common Law:
Greenhouse Gas Nuisance Claims After AEP v. Connecticut, 99 VA. L. REV. 131, 150 (2013) (stating
that “the two statutes feature nearly identical savings clauses and employ similar ‘cooperative
federalism’ structures”).
336. Bell, 734 F.3d at 198 (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)).
337. Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 495–96 (1987). “An action brought against IPC
under New York [source state] nuisance law would not frustrate the goals of the CWA as would a suit
governed by Vermont [affected state] law.” Id. at 498.
338. North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 615 F.3d 291, 303 (4th Cir. 2010).
339. Id. at 296–97.
340. Id. at 300.
341. Id. at 306–07.
342. Id. at 308.
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stringent than North Carolina’s own legislation.343
The Supreme Court in Ouellette endorsed application of source state
common law precisely because these concerns about inconsistent
regulation do not apply when such law is used.344 The Court recognized a
“regulatory partnership” between the federal government and the source
state due to the role envisioned for the source state within the CWA.345
Like the CAA, the CWA establishes source state permitting systems and
allows states to impose stricter standards than those required by federal
law without undermining the federal-state regulatory partnership.346 Thus,
the Court held an action brought under source state law “would not
frustrate the goals of the CWA”347 because it did not upset the balance
among the interests of the federal government, the source state, and the
affected state, and because it restricted the number of “indeterminate . . .
potential regulations” to only a single additional authority.348 The Fourth
Circuit correctly noted that Ouellette did not foreclose all state tort
actions,349 yet it failed to recognize the Court’s nuanced distinction
between affected and source state actions when it concluded that Ouellette
supported its contention that due to their “considerable potential mischief .
. . the strongest cautionary presumption” should apply against state
nuisance actions.350
343. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.107D (2018). See North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tennessee
Valley Authority, 593 F.Supp. 2d 812, 829–31 (discussion of the common law of nuisance in
Alabama, Kentucky and Tennessee)
344. Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 498–99 (1987).
345. Id. at 490–91, 499.
346. The Court pointed to its earlier decisions holding that when imposing stricter limitation
standards authorized under the CWA, a source state may do so by either state statute or nuisance law.
Id. at 497.
347. Id. at 498.
348. Id. at 499.
349. See North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tenn. Valley Auth, 615 F.3d 291, 303 (4th Cir. 2010).
(“The Ouellette Court itself explicitly refrained from categorically preempting every nuisance action
brought under source state law.”).
350. Id. Although Ouellette dealt only with the CWA, and not the CAA, many lower courts have
indicated that this would not make a difference. See, e.g., Technical Rubber Co. v. Buckeye Egg Farm,
L.P., No. 2:99-CV-1413, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8602, at *15–16 (S.D. Ohio June 16, 2000) (quoting
Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of Ontario v. City of Detroit, 874 F.2d 332, 343 (6th
Cir. 1989)) (holding the CAA did not preempt plaintiff’s source state nuisance claims, citing Ouellette
and explaining, “there was no reason to think that the result with regard to air pollution” and the CAA
should be any different); Gutierrez v. Mobil Oil Corp, 798 F. Supp. 1280, 1283 (W.D. Tex. 1992)
(similar holding and finding that “Congress did not intend to preempt state authority” with respect to
the CAA). See also People ex rel. Madigan v. PSI Energy, Inc., 847 N.E.2d 514, 517–18 (Ill. App. Ct.
2006) (rejecting plaintiff’s nuisance claims because they were brought under the law of Illinois, as
opposed to the source state law of Indiana). Cf. Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Province of Ontario
v. Detroit, 874 F.2d 332 (6th Cir. 1989) (finding the CAA did not preempt plaintiff’s suit under state
statutory law, the Michigan Environmental Protection Act). But see Clean Air Mkts. Grp. v. Pataki,
338 F.3d 82, 88–89 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding New York’s cap and trade emissions program preempted
by the CAA because its placement of restrictions on upwind transfers directly contradicted Congress’s
mandate that this type of state program could not restrict allowance trading). These courts recognize
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When it declared that any state tort action seeking to establish standards
“different” from the state or federal scheme deserves the “strongest
cautionary presumption” against it,351 the Fourth Circuit ignored the
Supreme Court’s directive in Ouellette “not [to] lightly infer preemption.”352 Although the Fourth Circuit was careful not to “state
categorically . . . a flat-out preemption” rule, its “strongest cautionary
presumption” language encourages trial courts to characterize all state tort
actions involving air pollution, regardless of whether applying the
common law of an affected or source state, as inherently suspect.353 This
imposes a much higher burden on plaintiffs than the Supreme Court ever
intended.
If compliance with existing regulations is a complete defense to a
common law nuisance action, this would remove the ability of the
common law to serve its traditional role as a backstop to redress harm that
is not adequately prevented by regulation. Ever since a British court in
1862 in Bamford v. Turnley overruled Hole v. Barlow, it has been
recognized that the mere fact that a source or activity is not violating
existing regulations should not be a defense to nuisance liability.354
In Milwaukee II the Court explained that the standard for inferring
displacement of “federal common law is not the same as that employed in
deciding if federal law pre-empts state law.”355 The latter, because it
involves superseding the “historic police powers of the States” should not
be inferred without a determination that it “was the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress” to do so.356 Federalism concerns are not implicated
in assessing displacement of federal common law, the Court explained,
because in such cases “we start with the assumption that it is for Congress,
not federal courts, to articulate the appropriate standards to be applied as a
matter of federal law.”357 Thus, despite the concerns expressed in AEP
about judicial competence to decide complex transboundary nuisance
cases, it remains difficult to find preemption of source state common law,
that Ouellette distinguished between state common law actions that remained viable because they
applied the law of the source state and those that did not. See, e.g., Bravman v. Baxter Healthcare
Corp., 842 F. Supp. 747, 752 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (citing Ouellette for the proposition that “although the
Clean Water Act preempts nuisance actions under state law against out-of-state sources, it does not
preempt such actions against in-state polluters”); Technical Rubber Co., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8602,
at *15–16 (recognizing that Ouellette preempted only affected state tort actions, but permitted source
state tort actions).
351. North Carolina ex rel. Cooper, 615 F.3d at 303.
352. Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 491.
353. North Carolina ex rel. Cooper, 615 F.3d at 303.
354. Bamford v. Turnley (1862) 122 Eng. Rep. 27, 30 (overruling Hole v Barlow (1858) 140
Eng. Rep. 1113, 4 C.B.N.S. 334).
355. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. 304, 316 (1981).
356. Id. (quoting Jones v Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)).
357. Id. at 317 (footnote omitted).
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particularly in light of the savings clauses contained in the federal
environmental statutes.358 Several cities, counties and states have filed
common law nuisance suits against oil companies, seeking remedies in the
face of damage wrought by climate change as part of a broader climate
change litigation strategy.359 In March 2018 Federal District Judge Vince
Chhabria rejected an effort by oil companies to remove to federal court a
state nuisance law climate suit brought by San Mateo and Marin counties
and the city of Imperial Beach, California.360 Judge Chhabria ruled that the
cases were properly brought in California state court.361 On June 25, 2018,
Federal District Judge William Alsup dismissed a similar climate nuisance
suit filed by the cities of Oakland and San Francisco.362 After holding a
“science tutorial” on climate change, Judge Alsup concluded that the
dispute “is not over science.”363 He observed, “All parties agree that fossil
fuels have led to global warming and ocean rise and will continue to do so,
and that eventually the navigable waters of the United States will intrude
upon Oakland and San Francisco.”364 Judge Alsup noted that if the lawsuit
only pertained to GHG emissions within the U.S., it would be displaced by
AEP and Kivalina.365 But because it also involved emissions caused by the
defendants’ product sold outside the U.S., he did not find displacement.366
Instead he concluded that the lawsuits “are foreclosed by the need for
federal courts to defer to the legislative and executive branches when it
comes to such international problems . . . .”367
On July 19, 2018, Federal District Judge John F. Keenan dismissed the
city of New York’s common law nuisance suit against BP, Chevron,
Conoco Phillips, ExxonMobil and Royal Dutch Shell for fossil fuel

358. One must be cautious about making predictions concerning preemption particularly in light
of the tug-of-war over preemption in state products liability cases involving pharmaceuticals, Wyeth v.
Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009), medical devices, Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008), and
highway safety standards, Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000). See Lisa Heinzerling,
Climate, Preemption, and the Executive Branches, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 925 (2008) (questioning whether
federal preemption will be invoked in the future to block more stringent state laws to control emissions
of GHGs).
359. One commentator asserted that the fossil fuel industry’s “tobacco moment” has arrived.
Douglas Kysar, Fossil Fuel Industry’s ‘Tobacco Moment’ Has Arrived, LAW360 (Jul. 28, 2017),
https:// www.law360.com/california/articles/948361.
360. County of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., 294 F. Supp. 3d 934 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
361. Id. at 937.
362. City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., No. C 17-06011 WHA, 2018 WL 3109726, at *3, *9 (N.D.
Cal. June 25, 2018).
363. Id. at *3–4.
364. Id. at *4.
365. Id. at *6.
366. Id.
367. Id.
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production that contributes to climate change.368 Citing AEP, the judge
held that the CAA displaces the federal common law of nuisance because
it gives EPA responsibility to regulate emissions of GHGs.369 Responding
to the city’s state law nuisance claim, Judge Keenan distinguished the case
from AEP, which refused to decide whether the CAA displaces state law
nuisance claims.370 Because New York City’s case involved the use of
fossil fuels sold worldwide, rather than emissions from specific power
plants as in AEP, the judge held that state nuisance law could not be used
because a single federal standard should apply.371
As discussed below, innovative climate litigation has been filed in
several other states.372 Although it remains to be seen how successful these
lawsuits will be, they reflect an increased willingness by state and local
governments to address the multifaceted problems caused by climate
change through common law nuisance litigation.
4. Other Avenues for Climate Change Litigation
Finally, common law claims brought under legal theories other than
nuisance law, such as the public trust doctrine, have added yet another new
dimension to climate change litigation. For example, in the highly reported
and closely watched “Children’s Crusade” case, twenty-one individuals
(all under twenty years of age) have sued the United States to compel the
reduction of CO2 emissions.373 In Juliana v. United States, the litigants are
alleging (1) violations of substantive due process rights to life, liberty and
property and (2) common law violations of the public trust doctrine.374
While this litigation is in the early stages, it represents another effort to
use the common law—in this case the public trust doctrine—to safeguard
the environment for future generations.375
368. City of New York v. BP P.L.C., No. 18 Civ. 182 (JFK), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120934
(S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2018).
369. Id. at *14.
370. Id. at *19.
371. Id. at *19–20.
372. See, e.g., John Schwartz, Young People are Suing the Trump Administration over Climate
Change. She’s Their Lawyer, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2018) available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/
10/23/climate/kids-climate-lawsuit-lawyer.html. See Sabin Center for Climate Change Law, U.S.
Litigation Database, U.S. Climate Change Litigation, http://climatecasechart.com/casecategory/environ mentalist-lawsuits-state-law-claims/
373. Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (D. Or. 2016).
374. Id. at 1233.
375. The public trust doctrine is a common law principle with ancient origins whereby the
government has a duty to safeguard certain natural resources for the benefit of the public. The
plaintiffs in Juliana seek a declaration that their rights have been violated and an order requiring
federal officials to develop a plan to control emissions of GHGs. The court rejected the government’s
argument that the case raises a non-justiciable political question and has allowed discovery to proceed.
Id. at 1241–42. The Justice Department asked both the Ninth Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court to
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Using constitutional and tort theories, courts in Pakistan and the
Netherlands have ordered the government to take more aggressive action
to control GHG emissions. In September 2015 the Lahore High Court
Green Bench found that the Pakistani Government’s failure to implement
the National Climate Change Policy of 2012 and the Framework for
Implementation of Climate Change Policy during the 2014–30 period
“offends the fundamental rights of the citizens which need to be
safeguarded.”376 Invoking the right to life and the right to dignity in
Pakistan’s Constitution, the court ordered government ministries and
departments to prepare a list of adaptation measures and to implement
Pakistan’s National Climate Change Policy. It established a Climate
Change Commission to help it monitor their progress.377
In the Netherlands the Urgenda Foundation, a Dutch environmental
group, joined by nearly nine hundred Dutch citizens, sued the federal
government for its adoption of GHG reduction goals that allegedly
violated the government’s constitutional duty of care to protect them.378 In
June 2015 a Dutch district court in The Hague cited the European
Convention on Human Rights and tort law theories to order the Dutch
government to take stronger measures to respond to climate change.379 The
court mandated that the Dutch government reduce emissions of GHGs by
twenty-five percent below 1990 levels by the year 2020.380 The court
concluded that the government’s previous seventeen percent reduction
goal was inadequate to meet the nation’s fair share of the emissions
reductions required to protect its citizens.
CONCLUSION
Congress first enacted comprehensive federal regulatory programs to
protect the environment in the early 1970s. Prior to the enactment of such
issue a writ of mandamus to halt discovery and a subsequent trial. After the Ninth Circuit denied the
motion, In re United States, 884 F.3d 830 (9th Cir. 2018), the Supreme Court on July 30, 2018, also
denied relief, United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Or., No. 18A65, 2018 WL 3615551 (U.S.
July 30, 2018). In an unsigned order the Court called the government’s request for relief “premature.”
Id. However, the Court cautioned that the “breadth of respondents’ claims is striking,” and it opined
that “the justiciability of those claims presents substantial grounds for difference of opinion.” Id. The
Court’s order cautioned the federal district court hearing the case to “take these concerns into account
in assessing the burdens of discovery and trial, as well as the desirability of a prompt ruling on
the Government’s pending dispositive motions.” Id. On October 19, 2018 Chief Justice Roberts issued
a temporary stay of discovery and the trial. In re United States, et al., No. 18A410,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/1 01918zr1_086c.pdf.
376. Ashgar Leghari v. Fed’n of Pakistan, (Sept. 4, 2015) W.P. No. 25501/2015 (Lahore High
Ct.).
377. Id.
378. Urgenda Found. v. Kingdom of the Netherlands (Rb. Haag 2015).
379. Id.
380. Id. The Dutch government is appealing this decision.
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programs, the common law of nuisance was the primary legal vehicle for
redressing pollution problems. Early in the twentieth century, states
invoked the federal common law of nuisance to seek intervention by the
U.S. Supreme Court in disputes over transboundary air and water
pollution. The Court, exercising its original jurisdiction over disputes
between states, heard several interstate nuisance cases and used its
equitable powers to stop environmentally destructive actions.
After more than a century of evolution, the federal common law of
interstate nuisance has been largely eclipsed by the rise of the regulatory
state. The Court has held that the CAA and CWA displace federal
common law for pollution problems they comprehensively regulate. But
for emerging problems not covered by existing regulatory programs, like
invasive species, the federal common law may remain a viable option.
In AEP the Court held that federal common law nuisance actions to
redress climate change had been displaced by the CAA in light of its
decision in Massachusetts v. EPA that the Act delegated to EPA the
responsibility to regulate greenhouse gas emissions.381 But the Court
reaffirmed the standing of states to sue, rejected the notion such lawsuits
raise non-justiciable political questions, and left open the door to state
common law nuisance actions to redress climate change.382 Principles of
federalism and the extensive savings clauses in the federal environmental
laws will make it difficult to preempt the state common law of nuisance.
Thus, if a state can show that its residents are suffering significant injury
that federal regulatory authorities have failed to prevent and for which an
express decision to preempt state law has not been made, state common
law actions founded on the law of the source state will remain available.
In AEP, the Court reaffirmed that environmental protection was a
proper subject for the development of federal common law.383 It also
emphasized that expert administrative agencies generally are more capable
than the judiciary at fashioning solutions for complex environmental
problems.384 Yet the judiciary has played an important role as a catalyst for
action when activities causing significant harm otherwise have escaped
regulation. Direct judicial intervention to stop interstate pollution is rare
today, but when regulation fails, common law remedies can serve as an
important backstop. The Trump Administration’s aggressive efforts to
dismantle regulation of GHG emissions and to deny the reality of climate

381. AEP, 564 U.S. 410, 424 (2011).
382. Id. at 420.
383. Id. at 421 (quoting Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—And of the New Federal Common
Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 421–22 (1964)).
384. Id. at 424.
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change could revive federal common law,385 particularly if EPA reverses
its endangerment finding or Congress overrules Massachusetts v. EPA.
Judicial intervention to stop interstate pollution remains rare, but the
common law of interstate nuisance still retains vitality as a backstop when
regulation fails to respond to a serious problem.386 And this is particularly
true when states sue. Moreover, in light of the judiciary’s historic role in
responding when the other branches of government fail to address
significant environmental harm, the common law may return as a viable
catalyst for change if official climate denial persists.387
The Court in AEP was surely correct that administrative agencies like
EPA possess greater expertise than the judiciary in fashioning responses to
climate change. This is why Congress has assigned EPA the primary
responsibility for protecting the public against pollutants that endanger
public health or welfare. But displacement of federal common law is not a
license to deny or ignore a global environmental crisis. If EPA becomes
the captive of official climate change denial, common law litigation may
return to its historic role as an important catalyst for action.

385. Fear of reviving federal common law nuisance suits reportedly was a factor in industry
lawyers praising the Trump Administration for proposing new, albeit much weaker, regulations of
GHG emissions to replace the Obama Administration’s Clean Power Plan. Ellen M. Gilmer, Proposed
Climate Rule May Help Hamstring Nuisance Claims, E&E NEWS, (Aug. 24, 2018),
https://www.eenews.net/
stories/1060095165/print [https://perma.cc/XZE6-HBP6].
386. Ewing & Kysar, supra note 23.
387. Indeed, despite the environmental litigants’ defeat in the Fourth Circuit in North Carolina.
ex rel. Cooper v. Tennessee Valley Authority, the threat of future litigation brought the parties to the
negotiating table, resulting in significant decreases in air pollution. See supra Part III.

